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Articles
Summary Judgment in Rhode Island:
Is It Time to Wrap the Mantra in
Celotex?
Honorable Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr.*

It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafterfor a long time cease to provoke further analysis.
Oliver Wendell Holmes'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Like an old religion whose contemporary adherents chafe
under the regime of an ancient liturgy and insist upon modern
metaphors for their worship, the law has its own litany of maxims
and mantras that no longer inform or enlighten in a way they may
have done when first utilized. Nowhere is this more evident than
in the area of summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 where the controlling mantra of the
* Associate Justice, Rhode Island Superior Court. I thank Judge Francis
Darigan, Christopher Rawson, Caitlin Riley, Judge Judith Savage, and Linda
Rekes Sloan for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also
benefited from the able and thorough research assistance of Kimberly Norato,
Roger Williams University School of Law, Class of 1998, and Eva Badway. Naturally, any errors are mine.

1. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. Rule 56 provides:
Summary Judgment.-(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement
of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof.
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(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may,
at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for summary
judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this
rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy,
and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the afflant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for surnmary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
adverse party.
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for the reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction
of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the
court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
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Rhode Island Supreme Court for the past quarter of a century has
been that "summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be
cautiously applied."3 This language is recited regardless of
vits caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees,
and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 56.
Although the purpose of this article is not to provide a historical analysis of
the development of summary judgment in the state of Rhode Island, one should
note that as early as 1929, statutes provided for summary judgment in a contract
action where the plaintiff sought to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money
payable by the defendant. See RI. Gen. Laws ch. 333, § 29 (1929); see also Sutter v.
Harrington, 154 A. 756 (RI. 1930); Rosenthal v. Halsband, 152 A. 320 (ILL 1930);
Morris Plan Co. v. Whitman, 150 A. 121 (MI. 1930) (illustrating the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's application of that statute).
Moreover, Rhode Island General Laws section 9-7-1 provided for a motion for
judgment on the pleadings; however, it also applied only to contract actions. RI.
Gen. Laws § 9-7-1 (repealed 1965). On January 10, 1966, Rhode Island adopted
Civil Procedure Rule 56, which was identical to Federal Rule 56 of Civil Procedure.
RI. Super. R. Civ. P. 56 reporter's notes.
See Robert Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38
Yale L.J. 193 (1928) (providing a more detailed history of summary judgment comparing the English rules with early-American versions of summary judgment); see
also John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary JudgmentProcedure,31 Ind.
L.J. 329 (1956); Charles Clark & Charles Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38
Yale L.J. 423 (1928); William David Carlist et al., Summary Adjudication: Dispositive Motions and Summary Trials (1990); Warren Freedman, Summary Judgment
and Other Preclusive Devices (1989) (providing an in-depth analysis of summary
judgment procedure).
3. Ladouceur v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 302 A.2d 801, 803 (LI. 1973);
see also Elgabri v. Lekas, 681 A.2d 271, 275 (R.L 1996); Boland v. Tiverton, 670
A.2d 1245, 1248 (R.I. 1996); Pound Hill Corp. v. Perl, 668 A.2d 1260, 1263 (RI.
1996); Smith v. Tully, 665 A.2d 1333, 1335 (LI. 1995); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Russo Bros., Inc., 641 A.2d 1297, 1301 (RI. 1994) (Murray, J., dissenting);
Regnier v. Cahil, 618 A.2d 1266, 1276 (R.I. 1993); Russian v. Life-Cap Tire Serv.,
Inc., 608 A.2d 1145, 1146 (R.I. 1992); Ferro v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 588
A.2d 1047, 1049 (RI. 1991); McPhillips v. Zayre Corp., 582 A.2d 747, 748 (IL
1990); Trend Precious Metals Co. v. Sammartino, Inc., 577 A.2d 986, 989 (LI.
1990); Mullins v. Federal Dairy Co., 568 A.2d 759, 761 (LI. 1990); Mignone v.
Fieldcrest Mills, 556 A.2d 35, 37 (MI. 1989); Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A-2d 855, 856
(LI. 1988); O'Coin v. Woonsocket Instl Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263, 1263 (lI. 1988);
Cardi Corp. v. Rhode Island, 524 A.2d 1092, 1096 (R.I. 1987); Violet v. Travelers
Express Co., 502 A.2d 347, 348 (R.I. 1985); Norberg v. Feist, 495 A.2d 687, 689
(MI. 1985); Commercial Union Co. v. Graham, 495 A.2d 243,245 (RLI. 1985); Brill
v. Citizens Trust Co., 492 A.2d 1215, 1217 (RI. 1985); People's Trust Co. v.
Searles, 486 A.2d 619, 620 (LI. 1985); Reed v. Notorantonio, 477 A.2d 954, 955
(R-I. 1984); Rustigian v. Celone, 478 A.2d 187, 189 (RI. 1984); Berube v. Matoian,
463 A.2d 183, 184 (RI. 1983); Berarducci v. Rhode Island Hospital, 459 A.2d 963,
964 (RI. 1983); Saltzman v. Atlantic Realty Co., Inc., 434 A.2d 1343, 1344 (R.I.
1981); Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338, 339-40 (RI. 1981); Ardente v. Horan, 366
A.2d 162, 164 (LI. 1976).
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whether the supreme court is affirming or reversing the grant of
summary judgment in the court below. Ladouceur v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America,4 decided in 1973, appears to be the first
case in which the court employed that phrase. Prior to Ladouceur,
the words "drastic remedy" standing alone served as the approved
appellation for summary judgment.5
The imprecation that "summary judgment is a drastic remedy
and should be cautiously applied" is embedded in the Rhode Island Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence and is regularly invoked by trial judges entertaining motions and cross-motions for
summary relief. Anecdotally, I can report that during my period of
service on the Providence County Motion Calendar in 1995 and
1996, the members of the bar constituted a willing choir, apparently feeling constrained to recite the mantra regardless of
whether they were pressing for or opposing a Rule 56 motion.
However "drastic" the remedy and however "cautious" the trial
court should be in applying it, the supreme court has always held
that "when there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
judgment properly issues."6 This unremarkable declaration mirrors the language of Rule 56(c). Another frequently used comment
in this area which is not found in the Rule itself is the venerable
language that the trial judge is to "consider the affidavits and
pleadings in the light most favorable to the [non-moving party]." 7
My contention in this Article is that the ritual incantation of
these phrases and related ones by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, without explication or analysis, relegates summary judgment
to a disfavored position that is unwarranted and unjustified. Trial
judges laboring under the shadow of the canon of "drastic" and
"cautious" may often be inclined to reject a meritorious motion for
4. 302 A.2d 801, 803 (LI. 1973).
5. Hodge v. Osteopathic General Hospital, 265 A.2d 733, 737 (R.I. 1970);
Slelkin v. Tarkomian, 238 A.2d 742, 743 (R.I. 1968). When in Slefkin the supreme
court first characterized summary judgment as a "drastic remedy" it did so without

citation to any legal authority. Sle/kin, 238 A.2d at 743. Likewise, five years later
in Ladouceur, when the supreme court first added its warning that this "drastic
remedy" should be "cautiously applied," it did not cite any legal authority for its
characterization. Ladouceur, 302 A-2d at 803. In both cases, the court reversed
grants of summary judgment by the trial judge.

6. Saltzman v. Atlantic Realty Co., 434 A-2d 1343, 1344 (R.I. 1981) (citing
Ardente v. Horan, 366 A.2d 162 (R.I. 1976); Ladouceur, 302 A.2d at 803).
7. Kirby, Inc. v. Weiler, 276 A.2d 285, 287 (R.I. 1971).
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summary judgment. As little, if any, opportunity exists for the unsuccessful movant to remedy the denial in the supreme court, the
result is further delay and expense with the attendant possibility
of a settlement prior to trial in excess of that which should fairly be
associated with an unfounded claim or defense. As one respected
commentator describing the problem in the federal courts from his
vantage point in 1974 put it:
Most [summary judgment decisions] simply draw from the
available clich~s, which are selected in classic cut-and-paste
style to support whatever result the court feels is proper. In
reality most judges are simply muddling through and denying the motion whenever they are in doubt. This timorous
approach obviously reduces the danger of unjust dismissals,
but it does so at the cost of permitting at least some useless
trials to be conducted.8
I will argue in these pages that there is nothing drastic about
entering a summary judgment against a party whose claim or defense is without merit. Trials are ordained for one purpose and
that is to resolve factual disputes, or more particularly, to determine whether the facts support the contentions of the party to
whom the law has assigned the burden of proof. If a party with the
burden cannot produce evidence regarding material facts-or facts
of consequence 9-that would allow a reasonable jury to find in his
or her favor, then summary judgment is in order because a trial
would be a pointless and wasteful undertaking. Granting summary judgment in appropriate circumstances is no more drastic
than applying any other rule of procedure or evidence where
required.
In a similar fashion, to single out summary judgment from
among the other pre-trial procedures authorized by the Rules as
one that should only be "cautiously applied" is to unnecessarily tie
a millstone on its utility. It is a truism that judges should be cautious in ruling on any matter of significance, and they should never
8. Martin B. Louis, FederalSummary Judgment Doctrine:A CriticalAnalysis, 83 Yale L.J. 745, 746 (1974).
9. Rule 56(c) and (d) refer to "any material fact and "material facts" respectively. RI. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 56(c)-(d). But see I1. R. Evid. 401 (abandoning this
terminology in favor of the phrase "facts of consequence"). Rule 401 provides that
"'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
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be reckless regardless of what the impact of their ruling may be.
Motions to suppress in criminal trials, admissibility decisions, motions to sever, motions to vacate, motions involving discovery access to materials that are arguably privileged or constitute the
work product of an attorney and countless other rulings all call
upon a judge to approach the issues cautiously and carefully.
While there may be isolated appellate decisions in all these areas
counseling care and prudence on the part of trial judges, I am not
aware of any other aspect of trial or pre-trial procedure about
which the Rhode Island Supreme Court has so frequently waved
the flag of caution.
Whatever effect cliches, maxims and mantras have had in defining the parameters of judicial decision-making in the area of
summary judgment, they have failed to create an analytical framework to serve as a coherent guide for litigators and trial judges
seeking to reach outcomes that are principled, if not always predictable. With the objective of providing clear guidance to the federal trial bench and bar, the United States Supreme Court in 1986
handed down three decisions explaining the purpose and application of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:' 0 Matsushita Electric IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,"'Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.,12 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,'3 (the Celotex
trilogy). I will argue below that these three cases read together
move beyond the cich6 to a formulation of principles of analysis
that carefully define the role of the trial judge examining a motion
brought pursuant to Rule 56. These principles, if incorporated into
Rhode Island practice, would serve both the bench and bar, not to
mention litigants, by removing from the trial track those cases that
should not be there.
Additionally, I will argue that despite its own protestations to
the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has invited trial
judges on Rule 56 motions to weigh the evidence, at least to the
extent of making a determination as to whether the evidence supports inferences that a reasonable jury could rely upon to conclude
10. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is identical to Rhode Island's Rule 56.
See R.I. R. Civ. P. 56 reporter's notes; see supra note 2 (setting out Rule 56 in its
entirety).

11. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
12. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
13. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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that the proponent of the evidence can sustain the burden the substantive law has imposed on him or her (or it). 14. If this and the
other analytical guidelines of the trilogy were applied in Rhode
Island, our summary judgment jurisprudence would be advanced
far beyond incantations that it is a "drastic remedy that should be
cautiously applied" and "an examination of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other similar
matters [must be] reviewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion." 5
Of special significance for Rhode Island procedure-where, I
submit, "drastic" has come to be viewed as synonymous with "disfavored"-is the United States Supreme Court's ringing endorsement of the salutary purpose of Rule 56. "Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action' ...

16

The Celotex trilogy has been the subject of a considerable
amount of scholarly commentary 17 and is, not surprisingly, regu14. In Liberty Lobby, for example, after the obligatory declaration that a trial
judge entertaining a Rule 56 motion is not to weigh the evidence, 477 U.S. at 249,
the Court stated that the "trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum and
quality of proof necessary to support liability," id. at 254, and that "the determination of whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be
guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that applied to the case," id. at
255 (emphasis added). The injunction that trial judges not weigh the evidence did
not mollify Justice Brennan, who wrote in dissent that "the Court's opinion is ...
full of language which could surely be understood as an invitation-if not an instruction-to trial courts to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would." Id.
at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text
15. Saltzman v. Atlantic Realty Co., Inc., 434 A.2d 1343, 1345 (R.I. 1981).
16. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
17. See, e.g., Rodney L. Bean & Sean P. McGinley, West Virginia's Very Own
Celotex Trilogy, A Series of Recent Opinions by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West VirginiaReveals that the Rumors of Rule 56s Death Were Greatly Exaggerated, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 571 (1996); Robert M. Braton, Summary JudgmentPractice
in the 1990's: A New Day Has Begun-Hopefully, 14 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 441
(1991); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2067 (1989); William L. Kandel, Rule 56 After Celotex and
Liberty Lobby: The Increased Availability of Summary Judgment, 12 Employer
Rel. L.J. 491 (1986); Amy D. Ronner, Destructive Rules of Certaintyand Efficiency:
A Study in the Context of Summary Judgement Procedureand Uniformed Customs
and PracticesForDocumentary Credits,28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 619 (1995); Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A Proposalfor ProceduralReform in
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larly referenced in lower federal court decisions.' 8 It has also been
the CoreMotion Context, 36 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1633 (1995); Eric K. Yamomoto et
al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads;The Impact of the Celotex Trilogy, 12
U. Haw. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Gregory A. Gardillo, Comment, Summary Judgment and
Problems in Applying the Celotex Trilogy Standard, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 263
(1994); Kyle M. Robertson, Comment, No More Litigation Gambles: Toward a New
Summary Judgment, 28 B.C. L.Rev. 747 (1987); Mark C. Wilson, Comment, Civil
Procedure: Massachusetts Adopts the Federal Summary Judgment Standard,
Kourvacalis v. General Motors Corp., 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 191 (1992).
18. Celotex, Liberty Lobby and Matsushita have impacted the federal courts'
use of summary judgment. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881,
894-95 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324) (-The court must insist
that the party opposing the motion not rest upon 'mere allegations,'" but go beyond
the pleadings and by his or her "own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.'"); Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11
(2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1) (holding that "'summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.""); Williams v. West
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 459-61 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242)
(expounding on the fact that the summary judgment standard mirrors the directed
verdict standard and stating that, if reasonable minds could differ as to the import
of the evidence, then a verdict should not be directed); Ballinger v. North Carolina
Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 247-48) ("TIThe mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.").
But see Ballinger,815 F.2d at 1004 (referring to summary judgment as a "drastic
remedy"); Washington v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122
(5th Cir. 1988) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322) ('The Court has stated that Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c) mandates summary judgment in any case where a party fhils to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which he bears the
burden of proof."); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476 (6th Cir.
1989) ("Scholars and courts are in agreement that a 'new era' in summary judgment dawned by virtue of the Courts opinions in these cases."); Beard v. Whitley
County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323)
("However, when confronted with a motion for summary judgment, a party who
bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleading, but
must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial."); City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 198B) ("In Celotex, the Supreme Court
held that the burden on the party moving for summary judgment is only to demonstrate, i.e., '[to] point[] out to the District Court,' that the record does not disclose a
genuine dispute on a material fact.") (alterations in original) (citations omitted);
California Architectural Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d
1466, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987) ("In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying
what the non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary judgment,
has increased the utility of summary judgment."); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 979 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)
(Under the Supreme Court's recent guidelines, summary judgment must be
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discussed and followed to varying degrees by some state high
courts. 19 This is not the case in Rhode Island. Since the trilogy
granted against a party "'who fails to. .. establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial."'); Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.
1989) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325) ("Recently, in Celotex, the Supreme Court
held that the requirement that the moving party show initially the absence of a
genuine issue concerning any material fact should be understood as requiring the
moving party to discharge his burden "by 'showing-that is, pointing out to the
district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party's case."") (citation omitted).
For a practical recent illustration of the First Circuit's use of summary judgment aiter the Celotex, Liberty Lobby and Matsushitacases, see R.W. Int'l Corp. v.
Welch Foods, Inc., 88 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the non-moving
party proffered no competent evidence to rebut the historical facts relied on by
Welch Foods to justify unilateral termination of a contract).
19. See, e.g., Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 666 A.2d 146, 151-53
(N.J. 1995) (After an extended discussion of all three trilogy decisions, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that when considering a motion for summary judgement, "the motion judge was to engage in an analytical process essentially the same as that necessary to rule on a motion for directed verdict" and that
the judge was to undertake a "weighing process" that would be governed "by the
same evidentiary standard of proof-by a preponderance of the evidence or clear
and convincing evidence-that would apply at the trial on the merits.");
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 575 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Mass. 1991) (asserting that it was not bound to apply the summary judgment standard articulated by
the Supreme Court in Celotex, but declaring that "it makes eminent good sense to
do so"); Poplaski v. Lamphere, 565 A.2d 1326, 1329 (Vt. 1989) (quoting Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322) (drawing from Celotex the principle that summary judgement is "mandated" against a party who fails to produce sufficient evidence "essential to his case
and on which he has the burden of proof at trial"); Transportation Ins. Co. v.
Huntzinger Cost. Co., 507 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (following Celotrex
for the proposition that a party moving for summary judgement is not necessarily obliged to negate the opponent's position with affidavits but "need only explain
the basis for its motion" if such explanation will demonstrate the inability of the
opposing party to produce sufficient evidence supporting its claim or defense);
Hodgkinson v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 526 N.E.2d 89, 90 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (adopting the Celotex holding that the moving party does not always have to
negate the opponent's claim). But see G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 808
P.2d 851, 853-55 (Idaho 1991) (adopting, without any cogent rationale, the principle of Liberty Lobby that the trial judge considering a motion for summary judgment must do so in the light of the burden of proof imposed at trial in libel suits
only, but that the Liberty Lobby principle would not be used in a misrepresentation
claim even though the standard to be followed at trial was clear and convincing
proof); Carlton v. Alabama Dairy Queen, Inc., 529 So. 2d 921, 923 (Ala. 1988) (Despite its admitted awareness of Celotex, the court candidly adhered to the scintilla
rule, holding, in effect, that if a plaintiff opposing a motion for summary judgement
could produce "a mere gleam, a glimmer, a spark, the least bit, or the smallest
trace of evidence" the complaint could stand.).

162 ROGER WILLLAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:153
was handed down in 1986,20 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
inexplicably-and incredibly-has cited only one of the three cases
and then only on one occasion. 2 1 I say "incredibly" because the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, as a matter of declared principle,
regularly turns to federal case law when reviewing questions surrounding a Rhode Island rule that is a verbatim replication of the
federal rule addressing the same topic. This is done when Rhode
Island case law in the area is "undeveloped"2 2 or "sparse."23 "We
have repeatedly held that in situations where our procedural rule
is identical to the federal counterpart and our case law is sparse in
that area, we will look for guidance in the precedent of the federal
courts." 2 4

Indeed, in a 1972 decision regarding summary judgment, the
court declared: "Super. R. Civ. P. 56 is patterned on Fed. R. Civ. P.
56. Consequently, decisions of the federal courts, interpreting a
federal rule which is identical to our own, can and heretofore have
served as a guide to this court's interpretation of a comparable
rule."25 On an even grander scale, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has looked to the United States Supreme Court in such areas as search and seizure 26 and equal protection, this latter excur20. Matsushitawas decided on March 26, 1986. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 574 (1986). Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, and
Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, followed on June 25, 1986.
21. In a case arising under the Rhode Island Antitrust Act, R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 6-36-1, the Rhode Island Supreme Court referenced Matsushita for the proposition that "in antitrust cases summary judgment is appropriate when a plaintiff
fails to present evidence to support a conclusion that the alleged anti-competitive
conduct is more probable than not." UXB Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Rosenfeld Con-

crete Corp., 599 A.2d 1033, 1037 (IL 1991) (citing Matsushita,475 U.S. at 587).
22. Testa v. Providence, 572 A-2d 1336, 1338 (R.I. 1990).
23. Kirios v. Arsenault, 632 A.2d 15, 16 (R-1. 1993).
24. Id. at 16-17 (citing Kelvey v. Coughlin, 625 A.2d 775, 776 (II. 1993) (citing Cabral v. Arruda, 556 A.2d 47, 49 (RI. 1989)); Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp.,

489 A-2d 336, 339 (R.I. 1985); Nocera v. Limbo, 298 A.2d 800, 803 (R.I. 1973)).
This principle applies to the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence as well. See State v.
Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 908 (RI. 1995) (following Tome v. United States, 513 U.S.
150 (1995), for guidance in interpreting Rule 801(d)(1)(b) regarding prior consistent statements); State v. Traficante, 636 A-2d 692, 694-96 (RI. 1994) (turning to
federal case law in a case of first impression involving Rule 410 of the Rules of
Evidence).
25. Egan's Laundry & Cleaners, Inc. v. Community Hotel Corp., 297 A.2d 348,
350 (RLI. 1972).
26. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island occasionally has declared that article
I, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution erects a higher barrier than the
Fourth Amendment regarding searches and seizures. See, e.g., Pimental v. Depart-
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sion revealing an unhappy mimicry in the face of an express
declaration by the authors of our modern constitution that the
2
Rhode Island standard should be higher than the federal one. ?
While an ample number of reported decisions permeate the
area of summary judgment and Rule 56, these cases are rife with
maxims but thin on the type of thoughtful guidance found in the

Celotex trilogy. Nowhere in Rhode Island's summary judgment jurisprudence do we find any doctrinal or historical explanation as to
why Rule 56 has been selected from among all the other rules for a
cautious and restricted application. Clearly, the text of the rule
does not indicate that special treatment is warranted. In contradistinction to this approach, the United States Supreme Court, after asserting that the procedure defined in Rule 56 was to be
considered "as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,"
saw fit to explain its proposition with a reference to the evolution
28
of pretrial procedure.
ment of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1351 (R.I. 1989) (Article I, section 6 of the Rhode
Island Constitution prohibited the use of police roadblocks to examine all drivers
to determine if any of them were intoxicated, even though the Fourth Amendment
might permit such activity. "(A] principled rationale exists to depart from the minimum standards of protection provided under the Fourth Amendment."); State v.
Maloof, 333 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 1975) ("In the interest of giving the full measure of
protection to an individual's privacy, particularly as it relates to electronic eavesdropping, we shall insist upon a closer adherence to the Rhode Island statute than
may be expected by those who interpret the federal legislation. In so doing, we
give added meaning to the state's constitutional guarantee of privacy. . ... "). More

recently, the court abandoned some of its earlier holdings and expressly adopted
the views of the United States Supreme Court that the government need not show
any exigency in order to justify a warrantless automobile search. State v. Werner,
615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992).
27. Compare Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d
734, 738 (R.I. 1992) (stating that it would look to United States Supreme Court
precedent regarding the interpretation and application of the 1987 due process and
equal protection amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution, R.I. Cont. art. I,
§ 2), with Jones v. State, 724 F. Supp. 25 (D.R.I. 1989) (Then-Judge Lagueux observed that, although the language of article I, section 2 and the Fourteenth
Amendment are similar, the intent of the 1987 drafters, as revealed in the constitutional convention committee report was to "protect the citizens of the state if the
federal judiciary were to adopt a narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the future.").
28. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
Before the shift to 'notice pleading" accomplished by the Federal Rules,
motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were principal tools
by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and
prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources. But with the advent of "notice plead-
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Similarly, discussions in Rhode Island case law are "sparse," if
not nonexistent, regarding the showing to be made by the moving
party who wishes to call to the attention of the trial court the fact
that the opponent's claim or defense has an insufficient evidentiary
basis; the burdens of proof and persuasion imposed by the substantive law at trial and their relationship to summary judgment
considerations; problems engendered by an ambiguous affidavit or
self-contradictory positions on a specific point asserted by a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment; what a trial judge does
when evaluating the persuasiveness of inferences in determining
whether summary judgment should be granted; and so on. On the
other hand, the Celotex trilogy elaborates on these and other aspects of the summary judgment procedure with the result being
the creation of a framework of principles to guide the bench, bar
29
and litigants.
By way of a cautionary note, I contend that the United States
Supreme Court was less than candid in its discussion of the evaluative function discharged by the trial judge considering a Rule 56
motion, as the Court respected its own mantra that judges are not
to engage in any weighing of the evidence. This disingenuousness
provoked harsh criticism from Justices White and Brennan.3 0
But whatever its shortcomings, the trilogy articulates clear
and practical guidelines. Accordingly, it would be of great assistance to the trial bench and bar for the Rhode Island Supreme
ing," the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function anymore, and its
place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment Rule 56 must
be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting
claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims
and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing
such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Id.
29. The principles to be gleaned from the Celotex trilogy are discussed infra
Part IU.
30. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 600
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's "language suggests that a
judge hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case
should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff'); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 266 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating bluntly that
"the Court's opinion is ... full of language which could surely be understood as an
invitation-if not an instruction-to trial courts to assess and weigh evidence
much as a juror would"). For a discussion of this intra-Court squabble, see infra
Part III.
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Court to examine Matsushita,Liberty Lobby and Celotex and draw
from these opinions practical criteria for the evaluation of Rule 56
motions in this jurisdiction. While it is true that the United States
Supreme Court has no general supervisory jurisdiction over state
court procedures, 3 reasoned pronouncements of the nation's highest court should not be ignored or rejected without some logical and
principled justification for doing so.
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not yet drawn
upon the Celotex trilogy to formulate a coherent framework for assessing summary judgment motions, none of the maxims it has employed to define its interpretive approach--other than the "drasticcautious" mantra-contradicts the criteria enunciated in the trilogy. This is not to say, however, that the declarations of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, standing alone, logically and irresistibly
lead to the Celotex trilogy principles. As a start, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court should articulate specifically whether Rule 56 is an
integral3 2 part of the Rhode Island Rules of Procedure or whether
we are to continue to view the procedure it describes as "drastic" or
"extreme," to use the word Justice Lederberg selected in a decision
she wrote for a unanimous court shortly after her appointment to
that bench.3 3 It is my suggestion that in undertaking such a review, 34 the supreme court should also tell the trial bench and bar
whether, in effect, it has been employing the "scintilla rule" in determining whether the non-moving party has shown enough to
cause a rejection of the moving party's claim for relief under Rule
56. I say this because the United States Supreme Court declared
that the standard to be employed in evaluating a motion for sum31. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1248 (1994) ("Wle have no
supervisory powers over the state courts .... ").
32. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327; see also supra text accompanying note 16.
33. Hydro-Manufacturing v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 954 (1RI. 1994)
("As a remedy, summary judgment is extreme and must be applied cautiously.").
More recently, Justice Lederberg wrote similarly, with only insignificant changes
in phrasing, that "summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should be applied
cautiously." Rotelli v. Catenzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I. 1996).
34. I am well aware that all this Article or any law review article may do is
make suggestions and hope that the supreme court, the trial bench and the trial
bar will make use of them as the common law of summary judgment evolves.
Moreover, I realize that, just like its counterpart in the federal system, our high
court declarations regarding local procedure are final. As Justice Jackson correctly
wrote about the status of decisions rendered by a court of last resort, "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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mary judgment is the same as the one to be used when considering
a motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiffs case, a position held by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.3 5
The United States Supreme Court went on to remind federal
judges that the long disfavored "scintilla rule" was not to be used to
defeat the moving party on either motion.3 6 This is especially important for Rhode Island because many years ago, the Rhode Island Supreme Court joined its federal colleagues in rejecting the
scintilla rule, at least so far as judgments as a matter of law-then
37
termed directed verdicts-were concerned.
35. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 ("Tihis standard [of
Rule 56(c)) mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a) .... ."). The Rhode Island Supreme Court made a similar observation in PalInisciano v. Burriville Racing Ass'n, 603 A.2d 317, 320 (R-I. 1992). See
infra note 114 and accompanying text.
36. After noting that trial judges were to use the same standard when considering summary judgment motions and motions for judgments as a matter of law,
Liberty Lobby proceeded to remind federal judges that, since at least 1872, the
scintilla rule had been rejected. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-51. Thus, the
party opposing the motion could not escape either a summary judgment or a directed verdict simply by producing a scintilla of evidence in support of its cause.
The Court continued that:
"[flormerly, it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to the jury, but
recent decisions of high authority have established a more reasonable
rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a
preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed
to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is
imposed."
Id. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 82 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872))
(citing Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 120-21 (1875); Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U.S. 301, 307 (1896); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333,
343 (1933)).
37. By 1904 at the latest, Rhode Island had abandoned the scintilla rule.
Hehir v. Rhode Island Co., 58 A. 246, 248 (1904) ("A mere scintilla of evidence is
never sufficient to sustain a verdict, or, according to the modern rule, even to warrant the trial court in submitting the case to the jury."). In support of its assertion
about the existence of a "modem rule," our supreme court cited Commissioners v.
Clark, 94 U.S. 278, 284 (1876). Hehir, 58 AL at 248. Fifty years later, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court similarly addressed the situation when it considered the
standard to be applied by the trial judge confronted with a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of the defendant's case. Simeone v. Prato, 111 A.2d 708,
712 (1955) ("After defendants had rested it became the duty of the trial judge not
merely to determine whether plaintiffs' evidence made out a prima facie case for
the jury, but whether such evidence was sufficient in law to support a verdict in
plaintiffs' favor and if not to direct a verdict against them.").
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Lastly, my recommendation for the adoption in this state of
the Celotex principles is not motivated by any concern for crowded
dockets, real or imaginary, as that problem is in the lap of the presiding justice of the superior court and court administrators.
Rather, my objective is to save litigants, lawyers and the court
from wasting time and resources trying unfounded claims and defenses. Moreover, in so doing, the jury will be confined to its historic role of resolving genuine disputes about material facts and
concomitantly precluded from rendering verdicts supported only by
sympathy, bias or illogical and unlawful inferential leaps.

II. A Loox AT THE Czo-TX TRILOGY
The principles for analyzing Rule 56 motions set out in Matsushita, Liberty Lobby and Celotex revitalized, if not resuscitated,
summary judgment procedure in the federal courts, and there can
be little doubt that if the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied
these principles the same effect would be achieved. Each opinion
contributed separate principles, and a reading of the cases reveals
that the United States Supreme Court was interested not only in
resolving the controversies before it, but in providing federal trial
judges with workable criteria for use in future cases.
A.

Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.

When Matsushita was argued in November of 1985, Zenith
and the National Union Electric Corporation had been battling in
the lower courts for eleven years against Matsushita and twenty
other corporations that manufacture and sell television sets in the
United States. Zenith and National (the respondents in the United
States Supreme Court) contended that they were the victims of a
price cutting conspiracy on the part of Matsushita and the twenty
other corporations (the petitioners). The respondents argued,
among other things, that the alleged conspirators were selling televisions at artificially high prices in Japan at the same time they
were selling them at losses in the United States.3 8 As a matter of
substantive law, the Supreme Court declared that there could be
no recovery under United States Antitrust Laws based "solely on
38. Matsushita Elee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577-78
(1986).
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an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market."3 9 In sum,
Zenith's theory was that Matsushita and its fellow petitioners were
cutting prices as part of a scheme to hurt Zenith and that, conversely, the price-cutting was not simply a legitimate business de40
cision undertaken to gain a competitive place in the market.
In the course of reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court read
a voluminous record that was replete with expert economic treatises and depositions, not to mention numerous and lengthy lower
court opinions, all directed toward answering the question of
whether a predatory pricing conspiracy had occurred. 4 1 For our
purposes, it is not important how the Supreme Court interpreted
the contending economic data and theories; instead, what is significant is the methodology the Court handed to trial judges to resolve
such a complex factual dispute.
The Supreme Court focused on the requirement of Rule 56(c)
and (e) that a "genuine issue" grounded in "specific facts" must be
presented by the non-moving party to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. 42 In the dispute between Zenith and Matsushita, the
Court observed that the substantive law required that Zenith, in
order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, must show a plausible motive on the part of Matsushita to engage in price-cutting.
In addition, such a state of mind could be inferred only if all inferences pointed to a "rational economic motive to conspire." The
Court wrote, "[i]f petitioners had no rational economic motive to
conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally
plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy."43 Thus, we see the United States Supreme
39. Id. at 582.
40. Id. at 581-84.
41. In the first several paragraphs of the opinion, the Supreme Court described its challenge:

Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs 69 pages; the primary opinion of the
District Court is more than three times as long. Two respected District
Judges each have authored a number of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement.
In addition, the parties have filed a 40-volume appendix in this Court that
is said to contain the essence of the evidence in which the District Court
and the Court of Appeals based their respective decisions.
Id. at 576. Elsewhere, the Court extrapolated from the records containing economic analyses and theories. Id. at 588-95.
42. Id. at 586-87.
43. Id. at 596-97.
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Court culling through reams of contradictory economic materials
to determine whether twenty corporations agreed to lower prices to
damage Zenith and National Union.
The Supreme Court first made it clear that the issue must be
framed in terms of what conclusions the record could support if
placed in front of "a rational trier of fact."44 Matsushita and its
corporate colleagues had argued "that, in light of the absence of
any apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence of
conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could find that the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually existed."45 The
Supreme Court agreed with Matsushita and in doing so gave to
federal trial judges the standard of "plausibility," a standard to be
measured against the prediction of what a rational jury would do.
Plausibility is indeed the refrain throughout Matsushita:
It follows from these settled principles that if the factual context renders respondents' claim implausible-ifthe claim is
one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents must
come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their
46
claim than would otherwise be necessary.
It is also worthy of note that the Supreme Court observed that
the district court judge had reviewed a study of one of Zenith's experts in considerable detail, but had rejected the expert's assumptions, concluding that they were "both implausible and
inconsistent with record evidence."47 The Supreme Court said the
trial judge's analysis was "persuasive" and went on to say that "in
our view the expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has little
probative value in comparison with the economic factors ... that
suggest that such conduct is irrational."48
44. Id. at 587.
45. Id- at 588.
46. Id. at 587 (emphasis added). 'The Court of Appeals did not take account of
the absence of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy." Id. at 595 (emphasis added). "[TJhe court failed to consider the absence of
a plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing." Id. (emphasis added). "That
being the case, the absence of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct
charged is highly relevant to whether a 'genuine issue for trial' exists within the
meaning of Rule 56(e)." Id. at 596 (emphasis added). "In Monsanto [v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp.] we emphasized that courts should not permit factfinders to infer
conspiracies when such inferences are implausible,because the effect of such practices is often to deter procompetitive conduct." Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 594 n.19 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
505 F. Supp. 1313, 1356-63 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
48. Id.
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What, then, did the Supreme Court do regarding Rule 56 in
Matsushita? In my opinion, it gave to federal trial judges the authority, if not the mandate, to review even the most complex evidence and then make a determination as to whether the evidence
could support reasonable inferences by a fact finder regarding the
material prongs of the burden imposed by the substantive law on
the party seeking to have the favorable inferences drawn. While
antitrust litigation is not commonplace in the trial courts of Rhode
Island, when read together with Liberty Lobby and Celotex, Matsushita clearly requires the trial judge to thoroughly assess the
facts-dare I say weigh?-in order to determine if a jury could
reach one or more conclusions supported by the evidence.
B. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
In Liberty Lobby, syndicated columnist Jack Anderson had
written that a non-profit group of political activists known as the
Liberty Lobby, Inc., were "neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist."4 9 Liberty Lobby, Inc., brought suit against Anderson in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and Anderson sought summary judgment on each of thirty allegations of
defamation. The trial judge determined that the case must be
evaluated against the holding of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 0
and granted Anderson's motion, having concluded that Anderson's
research assistant had acted in a thorough and responsible fashion, checking numerous sources, all of which "precluded a finding
of actual malice." 5 ' In New York Times, the United States
Supreme Court held that a public official bringing a libel action
against a media defendant must prove that the defendant "acted
with actual malice-'with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not;" 5 2 and the court held
further that the actual malice "must be shown with 'convincing
clarity.'

53

In Liberty Lobby, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision
and Anderson sought relief from the Supreme Court, which stated
49.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 245 (1986).

50. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 246.
52. Id at 244 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280).
53. Id. (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86).
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the issue on the first page of its opinion: "this case presents the
question whether the clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement
must be considered by a court ruling on a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
a case to which New York Times applies."" Eleven pages later the
Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, and more specifically,
it held that the trial judge's task is to determine: "Whether the
evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that
actual malice had been shown with convincing clarity."65
In the intervening pages, the Supreme Court repaired to a
1944 decision where it said "that summary judgment should be
granted where the evidence is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for the moving party.'" 56 The Court elaborated that
it had observed on earlier occasions that the "genuine issue" standard of summary judgment is "very close" to the "reasonable jury"
directed verdict standard, and for this proposition, it referred to a
more recent case. The primary difference between the two motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made
before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed
verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that
has been admitted."5 7 The Court found persuasive the requirement of the criminal law that a judge entertaining a motion for
acquittal must determine whether the evidence could support a
58
reasonable jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
After marshaling these analogues, the Supreme Court gave its
directive to trial judges relative to what they must do in considering the burden assigned by the substantive law when scrutinizing
Rule 56 motions:
[Mie are convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of
proof that would apply at the trial on the merits. If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of
54. Id.
55. Id. at 257.
56. Id. at 251 (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620,
624 (1944)).
57. Id. (quoting Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745
n.11 (1983)).
58. Id at 252 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).
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a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he
thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other
but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the
plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
59
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
From these few sentences, we can glean several principles,
none of which has been addressed with any thoroughness in Rhode
Island's modern jurisprudence: 60 (1) summary judgment and directed verdict (or judgment as a matter of law) assessments are
substantively the same; (2) the scintilla standard is emphatically
rejected (again!); 6 1 (3) the judge is reminded that he or she neither
operates in a vacuum nor functions as a one-person jury; rather,
the judge must ask whether a "reasonable jury" could find for the
plaintiff in light of the burden imposed by the substantive law; (4)
trial judges may not stop their inquiry by simply evaluating
whether the party opposing a motion for summary judgment has
come forward with evidence on material points-"facts of consequence"-that rebuts the moving party's contentions; rather, trial
judges must ascertain whether the moving party and the opposing
party can fairly discharge the substantive burdens imposed by law;
and (5) the Court was not writing merely to resolve the dispute
between Anderson and the Liberty Lobby, nor simply to further
develop the law of libel; rather, it was stating principles applicable
in "run-of-the-mill civil cases."
Having demystified the question of substantive burdens of
proof and persuasion, the Court journeyed into the controversial
area of assessing and weighing evidence, just as it had done three
months earlier in Matsushita, though interestingly, the Liberty
Lobby majority did not refer to that case. Despite its obligatory
recitation that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the
59.
60.
61.

Id.
See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Commissioners of Marion County v. Clark, 94 U.S. 278, 284

(1876).
[B]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is or may be in every case a
preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to
find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the burden of proof is

imposed.

1997]

SUPMMAARY JUDGMENT

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge,"6 2 the majority opinion
declared that "a trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum
and quality of proof necessary to support liability under New York
Times."6 3 The Court concluded that "there is no genuine issue if
the evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient
caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence." 64
If a trial judge's scrutiny of the "quantum and quality" of the
evidence offered by the non-moving, or opposing party, and the
judge's consideration of the caliber and quantity of the evidence
against the legal standard the reasonable jury must apply in order
to find for the non-moving party, is not weighing, then it is hard to
imagine what does constitute weighing. Indeed, Justice Brennan,
writing in dissent, characterized the quantum and insufficiency
language as "an invitation-if not an instruction-to trial courts to
65
assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would."
C.

Celotex Corporation v. Catrett

Ironically, the case that gives its name to the trilogy involves
the simplest fact pattern and the least controversial offering of interpretive criteria. In 1980, Myrtle Catrett brought a wrongful
death action as administratrix for the estate of her late husband,
Louis, contending that he died as a result of repeated exposure to
"products containing asbestos manufactured or distributed" by
Celotex and 14 other corporations. 6 6 Celotex moved for summary
judgment, pointing out that in her answers to interrogatories Mrs.
Catrett failed to supply the names of any witnesses who could testify about Louis's exposure to any asbestos products which it manufactured or distributed.6 7 By the time the Rule 56 motion came
before the United States District Court for argument, Catrett had
submitted a transcript of a deposition of the decedent, a letter from
a former employer of the decedent, and a letter from an insurance
62. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255.
63. Id- at 254 (emphasis added).
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id- at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also infranotes 115-17 and accompanying text (elaborating further on the question of weighing and Justice Brennan's charge that the Liberty Lobby msjority allows it).
66. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986).
67. Id- at 320.
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company to her attorney, 'all tending to establish that the decedent had been exposed to [Celotex's] asbestos products."6 Nevertheless, Celotex prevailed on its motion for summary judgment by
arguing successfully that the "three documents were inadmissible
hearsay and thus could not be considered in opposition to the sum69
mary judgment motion."
The court of appeals reversed, holding, in effect, that the asbestos manufacturer had failed to produce any evidence by affidavit or otherwise to support its motion, but rather had simply relied
on the apparent defects in the case which Catrett sought to bring
forward. 70 The court of appeals claimed that Adickes v. S. H. Kress
& Co. 71 mandated this outcome,7 2 but the Supreme Court wasted

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 321-22.
71. 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970).
72. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321-22. The Supreme Court referenced the court of
appeals's reliance on Adickes for the proposition that "the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the burden of responding only after the moving
party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.' Id. at 322 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 756 F.2d
181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The Supreme Court stated that this was not a proper
interpretation of Adickes. I& In Adickes, a white school teacher, while in the company of several African-Americans, attempted to gain service at a racially segregated lunch counter operated by S.H. Kress & Co. Service was refused, and after
the teacher left the restaurant, the Hattiesburg, Mississippi police arrested her
and charged her with vagrancy. She sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
the United States District Court, alleging, inter alia, that S.H. Kress & Co. unlawfully conspired with the Hattiesburg police to deprive her of her civil rights. The
district court granted S.H. Kress & Co.'s motion for summary judgment. Adickes,
398 U.S. at 146-48. In reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court held that the
district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the restaurant.
Its rationale was that, despite the restaurant manager's declarations that he
neither entered into any agreement with the police to arrest the teacher nor observed any police officer in the store when she sought to be served in the company
of black people, the fact that the teacher, at her deposition, as well as a Kress
employee in an unsworn statement, indicated that a police officer was in the store
at the time of the incident gave rise to the possible existence of a conspiracy. Id. at
156-57. Kress, reasoned the Supreme Court, failed "to foreclose the possibility that
there was a policeman in the Kress store while petitioner was awaiting service,"
id. at 157; and it was for the jury to determine from all the circumstances whether
there had been a meeting of the minds between the police officers and Kress, id. at
158. Petitioner Adickes pointed to her complaint, her comment in her deposition
and the unsworn statement of the Kress employee about the presence of a police
officer, but she did not submit an affidavit to this effect. Id. at 156-57. The
Supreme Court held that this was not legally significant; '-blecause respondent did
not meet its initial burden of establishing the absence of a policeman in the store,
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little time in declaring that to the extent such a reading ofAdickes
was possible, it was incorrect and contrary to the express meaning
73
of Rule 56.

After observing that Rule 56(c) references "affidavits, if any"74
and that Rules 56(a) and (b) "provide that claimants and defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment 'with or without supporting affidavits,"'7 5 the Court declared that the party
moving for summary judgment is not obligated "to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even
with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proof."7 6 The Court held that the moving party's first

obligation was simply to make a "'showing-that is, pointing out
to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to sup77
port the nonmoving partys case."
Thus, Celotex clearly allows the party moving for summary
judgment on the weakness of her opponent's claim or defense,
rather than the strength of her own case, to "point" by way of argument-and without affidavits-to the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's theory of liability or defense. This
appears to be an eminently sensible approach, for, if the discovery
completed at the time the motion is brought reveals that the nonmoving party has insufficient evidence to support his claim or defense, then the moving party cannot do anything other than to
point this out to the trial judge.

petitioner here was not required to come forward with suitable opposing affidavits." Id at 160.

73. Celotex discussed Rule 56(c) in refining the Adickes holding. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322. The Court held that the production of evidence for the purposes of a

Rule 56 hearing depended on first resolving the issue of which party had the burden of proof at the trial. This being so, Adickes could not be relied upon to impose
upon a party moving for summary judgment the obligation to produce evidence

showing the non-existence of a material fact if that party did not have the burden
of proof: "but we do not think (thatAdickes]... should be construed to mean that
the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an
issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof." Id. at 325.
74. Id. at 323.
75. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(b)).
76. Id. at 325.
77. Id
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Elaboratingon the Celotex Trilogy

Several post-Celotex decisions of the Supreme Court have refined its 1986 holdings. The most important of these is Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation78 because it expanded upon the
meaning of the Rule 56(e) requirement that the opposing party
must submit in its "affidavits or . ..

otherwise . ..

specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."7 9 In National
Wildlife, the Court reiterated that Liberty Lobby clearly stated
that Rule 56(e) was not written "to replace conclusory allegations
of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit."80 A brief revisit to Liberty Lobby shows the Court pointing to
earlier decisions describing the type of information that will not
satisfy the requirement of Rule 56(e). For example, Liberty Lobby
held that if the opposing party's "evidence is merely colorable" 8 ' or
"is not significantly probative,"8 2 then the court may grant summary judgment.
In National Wildlife, the Court examined a controversy that
pitted environmental activists against the United States Department of the Interior and its Bureau of Land Management.8 3 The
National Wildlife Federation and some of its members brought an
action against various United States governmental agencies and
officials, contending that lands previously ceded for public use pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), had been withdrawn unlawfully from the protection mandated by that legislation and improperly made available for mining.84 The Court acknowledged that management of public lands
under the federal legislative regime had become "chaotic,"8 5 but for
our purposes, it confined itself to determining whether the Na78. 497 U.s. 871 (1990).
79. See id. at 884-85 (construing Fed. 1. Civ. P.
80.

56(e)).

Id. at 888 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986)).
81. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S.
82 (1967)).
82. Id. (citing First Natl Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)).
83. National Wildlife, 497 U.S. at 875.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 876.
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tional Wildlife Federation and the other plaintiffs below had stand86
ing to pursue their claims.
In National Wildlife, the district court had entered summary
judgment in favor of the government on the standing issue because
affidavits submitted by individual environmentalists claimed that
they used some of the public land in question for recreational and
aesthetic enjoyment without specifying whether that land was the
specific acreage being withdrawn by the government for mining
87
use.
There is no showing that Peterson's recreational use and enjoyment extends to the particular 4,500 acres covered by the
decision to terminate classification to the remainder of the
two million acres affected by the termination. All she claims
is that she uses lands "in the vicinity." The affidavit on its
face contains only a bare allegation of injury, and fails to
show specific facts supporting the afflant's allegation."
The court of appeals reversed the district court, reasoning that, at
worst, the environmentalists' affidavits were ambiguous and the

86. Id at 882. The environmentalists sought judicial review pursuant to section 10(a) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, [hereinafter APAI. They proceeded properly to the United States District Court after
exhausting their adminitrative remedies. Id. at 881-82. While the Supreme
Court scrutinized the propriety of the district court's entry of summary judgment
in favor of the government and the court of appeals's reversal of that decision, at
no time did the Court suggest that appeals brought into the federal courts pursuant to the APA were not susceptible to disposition pursuant to Rule 56. To further
biittress my contention that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation of
Rule 56 is unnecessarily restrictive, see Notre Dame Cemetery v. Rhode Island
State Labor Relations Board, 373 A.2d 1194, 1196 (LI. 1977). Notre Dame expressly declared that Rule 56 could not be used by a trial judge considering an
agency appeal brought under the Rhode Island Administrative Procedure Act, LI.
Gen. Laws §§ 42-35-1 to -18. Notre Dame, 373 A.2d at 1196 (4 LI1he motion for summary judgment, appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact in a
civil action, can play no part in the appellate proceedings involved in judicial review of contested administrative actions."). But cf Rhode Island Bd. of Governors
for Higher Educ- v. Newman (No. 94-737) (Feb. 17, 1997). Without referencing
NotreDame, the court considered a superior court grant of summary judgment in a
matter brought pursuant to the A.P.A_ Id. Did the court overrule Notre Dame sub
silentio?
87. National Wildlife, 497 U.S. at 887 (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
88. Id.
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district court improperly failed to resolve the ambiguity in favor of
their opposition to the government's motion s 9
To the court of appeals's generous, if not forgiving, approach to
the ambiguities in the non-moving parties' affidavits, the reply of
the Supreme Court was abrupt and clear: "That is not the law." 90
The Supreme Court emphasized that "the purpose of Rule 56 is to
enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a
specific fact essential to the other side's case to demand at least one
sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation
continues."9 1 Moreover, a trial judge cannot "'presume' the missing facts,"9 2 in this instance, the actual use by the affiants of the
specific acreage in question. The Court emphatically refused to
permit turning the strictures of Rule 56 into "a circular
93
promenade."
Most important, National Wildlife held that "'a District Court
must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party' only in the sense that, where the facts specifically
averred by that party contradict facts specifically averred by the
movant, the motion must be denied."9 4 Therefore, a trial judge
may not fill in the blanks for the opposing party; nor may a judge,
when confronted by a submission from the opposing party of two
alternative factual possibilities, one of which can lawfully support
89. Id. at 887-88 (citing National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 431

(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
90. Id. at 888.
91. Id. at 888-89 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 889.

93. Id.
[Presuming missing facts] converts the operation of Rule 56 to a circular
promenade: plaintiffs complaint makes general allegation of injury; defendant contests through Rule 56 existence of specific facts to support injury; plaintiff responds with affidavit containing general allegation of
injury, which must be deemed to constitute averment of requisite specific
facts since otherwise allegation of injury would be unsupported (which is
precisely what defendant claims it is).
Id. Our Superior Court Rules allow complaints to state causes of action and claims
for relief in the alternative, see LRI. Super. Ct. R. 8(a), and to submit alternative
defenses as well, see R.I. Super. Ct. R. 8(a)(2), but this should not lead to the conclusion that separate pieces of evidence leading to contradictory conclusions and
inferences may validly support the opposing of a summary judgment motion.
When this is permitted, Rule 56 proceedings indeed become a "circular
promenade."
94. National Wildlife, 497 U.S. at 888 (quoting NationalWildlife, 878 F.2d at
431).
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that party's claim or defense and one of which cannot, resolve the
ambiguity by selecting the former. Put another way, while the
rules may permit a complaint to state alternative theories of recovery or an answer to present various, and possibly inconsistent, defenses, 95 once the moving party places the issues before a judge
pursuant to Rule 56, the opposing party's obligations are both
more onerous and stringent and each defense or each claim asserted by the non-moving party must be supported by specific and
non-ambiguous evidence.
The Supreme Court has used other post-Celotx decisions to
underscore its earlier declarations. In Eastman Kodak v. Image
Technical Services, Inc., 96 the Court reprised its reasoning in Matsushitaby declaring, "if the plaintiff's theory is economically senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary
judgment should be granted."9 7 Kodak also demonstrated that the
Court did not believe that its approach was favoring plaintiffs over
defendants: "Matsushitadoes not create any presumption in favor
of summary judgment for the defendant."98
In Nebraska v. Wyoming,9 9 the Court reiterated that courts
must consider summary judgment with express reference to the
burdens assigned by the substantive law to the respective parties
at trial.100 The Court further reiterated that l[iln determining
whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court views the evidence through the prism of the controlling legal standard."' 0 '
I am not aware of any post-Celotex decision of the United
States Supreme Court signaling any retreat from the principles
enunciated in the trilogy. I turn now to an examination of the
95. PI. Super. Ct. R. 8; see supra note 93.
96. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
97. Id- at 468-69.
98. Id. at 478. Indeed, the trilogy does not create any presumptions in favor of
either plaintiffs or defendants as a class. The reason is that, post-Ceotex, the trial
judge must consider the allocation of the burden or burdens of proof by the substantive law, whereas in the pre-Celotex scheme, the non-moving party (usually
plaintiffs) may have enjoyed a preferred position as all their factual assertions in
opposition to a Rule 56 motion were taken as true. While the non-moving party's
evidence must still be accepted as true by the trial court, the further inquiry,
whether the non-moving party has produced evidence that could satisfy a reasonable fact finder as it applies the burden assigned by the substantive law, levels the
playing field.
99. 507 U.S. 584 (1993).
100. Id. at 590 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
101. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
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principles of the Celotex trilogy, especially in terms of what they
could mean-and, in my view, what they should portend-for
Rhode Island jurisprudence in the area of summary judgment. My
objective here is not to argue that decisions of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court made without reference to the Celotex trilogy have
been wrongly decided, though it is likely that in some instances an
application of these principles would have changed the outcome.
Rather, my concern is that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
draw upon the trilogy's declarations and insinuate them into
Rhode Island case law so that the trial bench and bar will have
principled guideposts to refer to when a party makes a Rule 56
motion.

Ill.

Is RiiODE ISLAND WEIGHING YET?

If any practical and principled development of Rhode Island's
summary judgment practice will occur in the shadow of the Celotex
trilogy, it is necessary, first, to determine what these three leading
cases decided relative to the judge's role in weighing evidence, disclaimers of the Court that the trial judge is not to engage in such
activity notwithstanding. Next, we must assess what trial judges
do in daily practice when confronted with a Rule 56 motion.
The resolution of the weighing issue is central to the implementation of the Celotex principles in Rhode Island. To date, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, just like the United States Supreme
Court, has stated that trial judges may not weigh the evidence
when considering motions for summary judgment. As with some of
their other pronouncements in this area, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes weighing. The
fact that a problem exists regarding both the definition and explanation of this process should be evident from the dispute that exists within the United States Supreme Court on this point. A
number of judges and commentators believe that weighing does
and should occur when a judge considers a motion for summary
judgment, and I share this view. Until the appellate courts forthrightly recognize that some weighing is taking place and that this
is proper and fitting, the rubric of "no weighing allowed" will continue to provide the reviewing court with a mechanism to overturn
any grant of summary judgment it wishes, simply by declaring
that the reasoning processes of the trial judge constitute weighing.
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This occurred in the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision of
02
McPhillips v. Zayre Corp.-

My view is that the trilogy permits weighing regardless of declarations to the contrary and that trial judges regularly weigh the
evidence to one degree or another in considering motions for summary judgment. In using the term "weighing," I mean the judge's
scrutiny of the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, measured against a principled prediction of what a
reasonable jury would do in light of the substantive law regarding
both materiality and the allocation of evidentiary burdens. Moreover, I am assuming that the judge considers, as he or she must,
that all affidavits, admissions and other assertions of fact submitted by the opposing party which could find their way into a form
that would be admissible at trial are accepted as true, and that the
judge steers clear of evaluating the credibility of any afflant or
other person who may be called as a witness.
The opinions of Justices White and Brennan in Matsushita
and Liberty Lobby reveal the internal split among the members of
the Court as to whether the issue of weighing on summary judgment motions finally has been resolved, or even coherently addressed. Indeed, Justice White's majority opinion in Liberty
Lobby, when placed alongside his dissent in Matsushita,reveals an
inconsistent approach at best. To reiterate, Matsushita was the
first of the trilogy decisions, and the majority opinion repeatedly
emphasized that the trial judge, in considering whether a "genuine
issue of material fact" exists, must consider the "plausibility" of the
evidence offered by the party opposing the Rule 56 motion.' 0 3 Obviously, a trier of fact could not find for the non-moving party at a
trial if that party's evidence is implausible or leads to inferences
that are implausible. Moreover, only "evidence that is sufficiently
unambiguous" may allow a trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party.' 0 4 If the best the non-moving party shows is that one permissible inference bolsters its claim or defense while the other does
not, then the party has failed to raise a genuine issue if it has the
burden of persuasion on that point.
102. 582 A.2d 747 (R.I. 1990); see infra text accompanying notes 134-50.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
104. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597
(1986).
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We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a
triable issue of conspiracy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Cook Service Corp., establishes that conduct that
is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal
conspiracy does not, without more, support even an inference
05
of conspiracy.'
These declarations prompted a cutting dissent from Justice White
who wrote that the Court's opinion "muddies the waters" by making "confusing and inconsistent statements about the appropriate
standard for granting summary judgment." 0 6 Justice White asserted that the Court had defied established precedent by permitting the trial judge on a Rule 56 motion to "decide for himself
whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff,"10 7 and investing the judge with "the job of determining if the evidence
makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not." 08
It was a different Justice White, however, who authored the
majority opinion in Liberty Lobby three months later. After cogently explaining the two separate analyses the trial court must
undertake to identify which facts are "material"10 9 and which evidentiary standard, or burden of proof, is to be applied, 1 10 Justice
White emphasized the Court's continuing rejection of the scintilla
rule. He cited an 1872 case which explained that a judge, in determining whether a jury should receive the case, must determine
"not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is
any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for
the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.""'
Writing for the majority, Justice White made several attempts
at defining what the trial judge must do when considering a motion
for summary judgment. In doing so, he observed that the summary judgment and directed verdict standards are virtually identical: "In essence, though, the inquiry under each is the same:
whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
105. Id- at 597 n.21 (citation omitted).
106. Id at 599 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 600.
108. Id. at 601.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442,
109.

448 (1872)) (emphasis omitted).
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submission to a jury or whether it is so one sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law." 112 Justice White went on to
write, inter alia, that "there is no genuine issue if the evidence
presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or
quantity."113 It is worth noting at this juncture that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in 1992, speaking through then-Justice
Weisberger, noted that there was "little difference" between the
standards applied to a motion for summary judgment and a motion
for a directed verdict. 1 14
It does not seem unfair to ask what a trial judge is doing when
he or she examines the evidence of the non-moving party to determine if it is of insufficient (or sufficient) caliber or quantity. The
simple answer appears to be that the judge is weighing the evidence, a process separate and apart from evaluating credibility.
Justice Brennan, who was the only member of the Court to
dissent in all three decisions of the Celotex trilogy, was as critical
of the Liberty Lobby majority as Justice White had been to the
Matsushita majority. Justice Brennan sardonically observed that
the "Court's opinion is replete with boilerplate language," and that
the Court "purport[ed] to restate the summary judgment test, but
with each repetition, the original understanding is increasingly
distorted." 1 5
Justice Brennan, who had joined with Justice White as well as
Justices Blackmun and Stevens in the Matsushita dissent, could
not enlist any of his colleagues to join his dissenting opinion in Liberty Lobby, but his criticism is trenchant:
I simply cannot square the direction that the judge "is not
himself to weigh the evidence" with the direction that the
112. Id. at 251-52.
113. Id. at 254.
114. Palmisciano v. Burriville Racing Ass'n, 603 A.2d 317, 320 (ILI. 1992).
If this [summary judgment] standard is compared with that for the con-

sideration of a directed verdict, little difference will be found save the
point in the proceeding wherein such motions will be considered. A motion for summary judgment will normally be offered prior to the com-

mencement of trial, and the motion for directed verdict will be offered at
the close of the evidence. Each, however, must establish that the proponent of the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that

there are no issues of fact for a jury or other trier of fact to determine or
resolve.
Id.
115. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 265 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

184 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:153
judge also bear in mind the "quantum" of proof required and
consider whether the evidence is of sufficient "caliber or
quantity" to meet that "quantum." I would have thought that
a determination of the "caliber and quantity," i.e., the importance and value, of the evidence in light of the "quantum,"
i.e., amount "required," could only be performed by weighing
1 16
the evidence.
Thus, the anomalous situation of Justice White chastising the
Matsushitamajority for allowing the weighing of evidence on summary judgment motions and then himself receiving a scolding from
Justice Brennan for the same transgression in Liberty Lobby
reveals that the best efforts of the majority opinions in the Celotex
trilogy have not definitively resolved this issue. Of course, this is
in no small part engendered by the unfortunate, continued obeisance of the Court to clichds about not weighing the evidence1 17 in
the face of express language that legitimately provoked the dissenting accusations of Justices Brennan and White.
Is there a way out of this tangle? Surely, in Rhode Island,
where the United States Supreme Court has no general supervisory power" 8 and where questions in superior court civil matters
regarding burdens of proof and the weight of the evidence are "normally not.., of federal constitutional moment," 1 9 the Rhode Island Supreme Court could declare that weighing is occurring when
trial judges consider whether the affidavits and other evidence
submitted by a party in a Rule 56 situation are "plausible," "sufficient," of a particular "caliber or quantity," etc. This hardly would
be an unprincipled flight of fancy in view of the Celotex trilogy as
well as cogent analyses from some earlier sources.
Witness the refreshing candor and practical wisdom of Judge
Rutledge's discussion of a judge's role in deciding whether a plaintiffs case "was strong enough for us to allow the jury to consider
2

it:"1o

116. Id. at 266.

117. See, e.g., id. at 255 ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge .... ").
118. See supra note 31.

119. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976).
120. Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 826 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (considering
the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of the defendants' motions for directed
verdict made at the end of plaintiff's case, a similar motion made at the close of all
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[Tihe jury is not absolute in the realm of fact. Like judges,
jurors have weaknesses of emotion and judgment. Unlike
judges, they seldom have a background of decision experience
against which to check them. Our tradition supplies this
through judicial controls. Exclusion of evidence is one. When
one side's case is thin, determining its "legal sufficiency" is
another. This really means weighing it factually, not for con12 1
viction, but for doubt as to the outcome.
This last declaration should be read in tandem with Judge Rutledge's statement that "evidence should not be so thin that it would
1
be dangerous for the jury to consider it." 22
It would seem, then, that Judge Rutledge, whose analysis was
termed "brilliant" by no less a student of the trial process than
Dean Wigmore, 1 2 3 is saying that the judge considering the "sufficiency of the evidence" on a motion for a directed verdict-which
we know is examined with the same standard that applies in summary judgment matters-may not consider the credibility of the
witnesses; rather, he or she must evaluate the inferences that reasonably flow from evidence that is required to be taken as truthful.
Two years later, as a member of the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Rutledge wrote in a similar vein that the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial in civil cases "requires that the jury be allowed to make reasonable inferences from
facts proven in evidence having a reasonable tendency to sustain
them," but that "it does not require that experts or the jury be permitted to make inferences from the withholding of crucial facts,
favorable in their effects to the party who has the evidence of them
in his peculiar knowledge and possession, but elects to keep it
SO."124

the evidence and motions to set aside the verdict and judgment, all of which were
denied).
121. Id. at 827 (emphasis added). Many years earlier, a common law scholar
made the same point with greater precision. '"e judge weighs the proof for one
purpose, and the jury for another. The judge weighs it to see that there might be a
verdict either way;, the jury weigh [sic] it to see which way it ought to be." Austin
Abbott, Two Burdens of Proof,6 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 126 (1893).
122. Christie, 124 F.2d at 827.
123. 9 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2494, at 383
n-13 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) ('This truth is emphasized by Rutledge, J., in his brilliant opinion in Christie v. Callahan.")(citation omitted).
124. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943). As if to prevent posterity from dropping the dreaded mantel of consistency on his shoulders, Justice
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In Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 12 5 the Supreme Court declared
that the trial court must conduct the analysis of the sufficiency of
the evidence on a motion for a directed verdict "without weighing
the credibility of the witnesses."'26 However, the Court did not preclude weighing in the sense of a reasoned consideration of the inferences to be drawn from evidence after considerations of
credibility have been placed aside. In short, the trial court was
allowed, indeed directed, to keep thinly supported claims and defenses from the jury in order to prevent it from engaging in the
unauthorized activities of speculation and sympathy.
It is of course one thing to recognize the long-standing proscription, not to mention the practical impossibility, of considering
the credibility of witnesses on a motion for summary judgment. It
is quite another thing to argue that on a Rule 56 motion, after the
evidence of the non-moving party is taken as true, the court subsequently must evaluate the evidence in light of the reasonable inferences that a jury could draw, keeping in mind at all times the
controlling substantive burden of persuasion in the particular case.
When the trial judge examines affidavits and discovery materials to determine whether a reasonable fact finder could reach a
verdict in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, he or she
necessarily must consider (read weigh) the intensity of the belief
on the part of the rational fact finder that the evidence will support, bearing in mind at all times that, under the Celotex trilogy,
the burden in each case resides in the substantive controlling law.
Just as with the situation confronting a trial judge on a motion for
a new trial, the permissible question is not how the judge would
Rutledge joined the dissent in Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476 (1943),
which gave us the Brady rule:
When the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the
witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, the
court should determine the proceeding by non-suit, directed verdict or
otherwise in accordance with the applicable practice without submission
to the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By such direction
of the trial the result is saved from the mischance of speculation over legally unfounded claims.
Id. at 479-80. 'Since that time, although they have used many different formulations, the federal courts have been reasonably consistent in the application of the
Brady rule.. . ." 5A James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 50.02(1],
at 50-25 (2d ed. 1996).
125. 320 U.S. 476 (1943).
126. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
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have ruled, but whether the evidence could support a favorable
jury verdict. In order to answer this question in the context of Rule
56, a forecast of the intensity of belief the evidence will engender in
a rational fact finder is unavoidable.
The controversy that formerly existed as to whether the standard of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence applicable in
most civil trials referenced a subjective state of mind or an objective standard 2 7 has been resolved, at least in the jurisprudence of
the United States Supreme Court, in favor of the subjective state of
mind viewpoint. In the recent case of Director, Office of Workers
Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,'2 8 the Supreme
Court reviewed the evolution in meaning of the term "burden of
proof' and concluded that "the modern authorities are substantially agreed that, in its strict primary sense, 'burden of proof signifies the duty or obligation of establishing, in the mind of the trier
of facts, conviction on the ultimate issue. ' " 2 9 Naturally, from case
to case, the degree of conviction, or intensity of belief, that the law
requires differs depending on which burden of proof governs.
127. See, eg., J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof.Degrees of Belief, 32 Cal. L. Rev.
242, 247 (1944) ("[The civil instruction] does not, as it should do, direct the attention of the jury to the degree of belief which the proponent of the proposition must
produce in their minds before he is entitled to a finding favorable to him...
128. 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
129. I& (quoting Burr W. Jones, The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases 310 (4th
ed. 1938)) (emphasis added); see also Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). The Court
again emphasized the state of mind of the fact finder. 'The burden of showing
something by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' the most common standard in the
civil law, 'simply requires the trier of fact 'to believe that the existence of a fact is
more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who
has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the faces ewxstence."" Id. (quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (citation omitted),
Concrete Pipe went on to state that "'[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing [body] on the entire evidence is left with definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
"A showing of 'unreasonableness' would require even greater certainty of error on
the part of the reviewing body." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242,252(1986)). In addition, one evidence scholar noted that "in the ordinary
usage of words there may be properly said to be degrees of conviction or persuasion." Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptionsand Burdens
of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 66 (1933); see also Barbara D. Underwood, The
Thumb on the Scales of Justice:Burdens of Persuasionin CriminalCases, 86 Yale
L.J. 1299, 1311 (1977) ('There is some evidence, then, that factfinders can distinguish among degrees of belief, and that rules about the burden of persuasion affect
the outcome of cases.').
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court presaged the observations of
the United States Supreme Court regarding subjectivity in Greenwich Collieries by nearly three decades:
To verbalize the distinction between the differing degrees
more precisely, proof by a "preponderance of the evidence"
means that a jury must believe that the facts asserted by the
proponent are more probably true than false; proof "beyond a
reasonable doubt" means that facts asserted by the prosecution are almost certainly true; and proof by "clear and convincing evidence" means that the jury must believe that the
truth of the facts asserted by the proponent is highly
probable.130

In my view, even if all that is considered is the United States
Supreme Court's continual and forceful rejection of the scintilla
rule, the 1986 mandate of Liberty Lobby that the trial burden be
factored into Rule 56 considerations, and the more recent pronouncements in ConcretePipe & Products v. ConstructionLaborers
Pension Trust for Southern California'3 ' and Greenwich Collieries
that references to burdens of proof are ipso facto references to a
subjective intensity of belief, then the only conclusion is that
weighing of the facts and the reasonable inferences they generate
is taking place, albeit without assessments of credibility. Moreover, the authority granted by the trilogy to trial judges to consider
the "caliber" and the "quantum and quality" of the evidence is, as
Justice Brennan wrote, "an invitation-if not an instruction--" to
trial judges to weigh the evidence.
IV.

Is RHODE ISLAND FOLLOWING Tfm Scnm.LA RuLe?

...AND

WHY?

Once again, I am not inquiring as to whether the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has decided some summary judgment cases incorrectly since 1986 because it did not follow the Celotex trilogy criteria, though reference to the United States Supreme Court's
principles regarding Rule 56 would undoubtedly have resulted in
some different outcomes. In any event, a response to such a question would be pointless because, as Justice Jackson pointed out
130.
131.

Parker v. Parker, 238 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 1968).
508 U.S. 602 (1993).
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some time ago, courts of last resort are not final because they are
2
infallible, but rather they are infallible because they are final.13
There are, however, more important questions, the answers to
which may provide some assistance in extracting Rhode Island's
Rule 56 case law from the stifling pall of the "drastic-cautious"
mantra and accompanying clichds. As two early and influential
students of summary judgment proceedings observed, "generalizations are of comparatively little assistance to the trial judge in disposing of the individual case." 133 To the question of whether the

current Rule 56 jurisprudence in Rhode Island is providing workable and useful guidelines to the trial bench and bar, my answer is
in the negative. The reason is that the cich6s and maxims employed thus far by the Rhode Island Supreme Court do not thoroughly and cogently describe what the trial judge is doing, or
should be doing, when considering a motion brought pursuant to
Rule 56. To those who would ask what should supplant the present state of affairs, I say that the "drastic-cautious" mantra should
be jettisoned, weighing on the part of the trial justice should be
candidly acknowledged and the Celotex trilogy criteria should be
adopted. This would take no more effort or intellectual fortitude
than the Rhode Island Supreme Court displayed when it modified
4
its position regarding the use of inferences. 13
If the Rhode Island Supreme Court is to reach the position advocated in this article, first, it must ask itself whether its modern
decisions in the area of summary judgment coalesce in such a way
as to lead to a reasonable conclusion that the scintilla rule is alive
and well in this area of Rhode Island procedure.' 3 5 In my view,
132. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); see
supra note 34 for the precise quote.
133. Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38
Yale L.J. 423, 450 (1928).
134. Waldman v. Shipyard Marina, Inc., 230 A.2d 841 (RlI. 1967). In Waldman, the Rhode Island Supreme Court candidly abandoned its prior reliance on
the judge-made rule against "the pyramiding of inferences, so called," id. at 844, in
favor of the approach taken in Arizona and Florida. That approach dictates that
"the integrity of the fact-finding process is protected, it being clear that when an
inference is such as to exclude any other reasonable inference being drawn from
the basic fact, such an inference partakes of the nature of a fact to which probative
force must be attributed." Id. at 845.
135. The continuing vitality of the scintilla rule, albeit sub rosa, is seen in the
recent memorandum decision of Goodkin v. DeMaio, 664 A.2d 1119 (IRI. 1995). In
that matter, the trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of a landlord
against a tenant who had brought suit claiming that a latent defect in a window
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this is the source of the "drastic-cautious" approach: an uncritical
solicitousness for the claim of a jury trial coupled with an unwarranted deference to the jury's prerogatives has led the court to articulate rules, such as they are, that allow cases to get to trial on
slight evidence. While the Rhode Island Supreme Court has never
held that the scintilla rule may be permissibly employed regarding
summary judgment or directed verdict considerations, its "drasticcautious" maxim and related pronouncements create a framework
that allows this rule to be applied in practice, even while it is not
expressly acknowledged. Several cases illustrate this point.
In 1990, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the tragic
case of McPhillips v. Zayre Corp.13 6 in which a young boy, Sean
McPhillips, became a quadriplegic after a failed attempt to ride his
bicycle off a retaining wall some two or three feet high.' 3 7 Sean
and his father sued the bicycle manufacturer, complaining that the
brakes were defective and did not respond as they should have
when Sean abandoned his original intent to ride his bicycle off the
wall "[wihen he was approximately one and one-half to two feet
away from the edge of the wall."' 3 s
The defendant bicycle manufacturer was successful in pursuing a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment in the superior court.
The principal materials the trial judge reviewed in considering the
motion were the depositions of Sean and his riding companion, Stephen, who already had successfully made the jump and watched
had caused the window to slam shut on his hand causing injury. In opposition to
the defendant's motion, the plaintiff tenants counsel argued that the landlord was
aware of the latent defect, but the trial judge found that there was no evidence to
support this claim and concluded: "'[tihere is nothing in the factual situation that
I've observed to explain why the window fell.'" Id- at 1120. In reversing the grant
of summary judgment, the supreme court said that "[tihis finding [by the trial
judge] constitutes a factual determination," and then observed that 'we find that a
question of material fact exists regarding the existence of the alleged latent defect
and that defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Contrary
to the conclusion of the supreme court, I submit that the trial judge was not improperly resolving issues but simply declaring that the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence-let alone sufficient evidence-in support of its claim that the
landlord knew of a latent defect. In sum, the tenant prevailed with less than a
scintilla of evidence to support his claim, and the supreme court muddied the waters further by substituting the existence of "a question of material fact" for the
focus required by Rule 56(c) as to whether there is a legitimate and "genuine issue

as to any material fact." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
136. 582 A2d 747 (R.I. 1990).
137. Id. at 748.
138. Id.
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Sean's attempt from twenty-five feet away, and the affidavit of
plaintiffs expert who had concluded, in the words of the supreme
court, "the brake would not have engaged correctly when Sean ap13 9
plied it in the ordinary manner two feet before the wall."
Stephen's deposition indicated that "he saw the rear wheel of
the bicycle stop immediately after Sean had leaned on the [pedal]
brakes and the bicycle continue over the wall simply because of the
speed Sean had attained." 140 For his part, Sean testified at his
deposition that the brakes had 'jamrned" and "locked" when he applied them, 14 1 but he also responded in the negative "when asked if
he felt the rear wheel lock after the brakes were applied." 14 2 The
manufacturer argued that "rear coaster brakes are supposed to
143
'lock' when functioning properly."
In making his ruling, the trial judge observed that the affidavit of the plaintiffs expert was conclusory, a point with which the
Rhode Island Supreme Court did not disagree.'" The judge further stated: "The bike didn't stop, and I doubt twenty-four inches
from the edge of the wall that any braking mechanism would have
stopped the bike before it went over the wall. ' " 45
In reversing, the supreme court concluded that the trial judge
had improperly passed on credibility, particularly in light of his
observation that no braking mechanism would have stopped the
bike,' 46 and that the superior court judge "dismisse[d] any possibility of a brake defect." 147 Additionally, the supreme court stated
that, because Stephen witnessed the accident from twenty-five feet
away, "the issues of witness credibility and reliability become crucial yet remain beyond the scope of what the trial justice may properly consider when deciding a motion for summary judgment." 48
Thus, the overweening deference to trial by jury and the concomitant truncating of the trial judge's reasoning powers-pre139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 749.
Id.
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id.

148. Id.
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49
sumably developed through legal training and life experience' leads to a scenario that defies the laws of biology and physics. In
McPhillips,the court opined that "[h]ad the judge been functioning
as a trier of fact, in all likelihood his determination that defendant's theory of the cause of the accident was more probable than
that of plaintiffs' undoubtedly would have been correct,"' 50 but the
trial judge's principal error in the view of the supreme court was
that "[h]e assessed the credibility of the witnesses and the persuasiveness of the evidence, a function denied him on such a motion." 15 1 As to credibility assessment being off-limits to trial
judges deciding Rule 56 motions, the supreme court is correct in
principle, even after the Celotex trilogy, but the same cannot be
said for its statement about persuasiveness. How else is a trial
judge to determine whether a party has presented evidence sufficient to satisfy its burden in front of a jury if it does not consider
15 2
persuasiveness?
In my opinion, the supreme court, in McPhillips, improperly
skewed the credibility admonition. Remember, the trial judge had
accepted Stephen's declaration concerning the bicycle accident on
its face, but the supreme court determined that, because the boy's
observation was made at a distance of twenty-five feet, it was presumptively incredible, or at least should go to the jury. This flies
in the face of not only the prohibition against credibility determinations being made on Rule 56 motions, but the equally well-established principle that a trial judge may reject testimony because it
is inherently improbable and contrary to the laws of nature. 1 53

149. The mists of time regrettably conceal this important point made more

than four decades ago by the Rhode Island Supreme Court: "The rule contemplates
that on . ..

a motion [for a judgment as a matter of law] the trial justice will

himself consider the evidence in the light of his superiorknowledge and experience
to determine whether [the evidence] is susceptible of an inference that is reason-

able and favorable to the plaintiff." Cote v. Arrighi, 162 A.2d 797, 799 (R.I. 1960)
(emphasis added); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
150. McPhillips, 582 A.2d at 750.
151. Id.
152. See supra pp. 195-99.
153. "[It is well settled that no weight is to be given to testimony that is opposed to the laws of nature or undisputed physical facts." Charles Allan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2527, at 285 (2d ed. 1994); see
also Zolman v. Symington Wayne Corp., 438 F.2d 28, 31-32 (7th Cir. 1971)
(describing this "physical facts" rule: "'[lit is well settled in this jurisdiction and
elsewhere that the testimony of a witness which is opposed to the laws of nature,
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Here we have a perfect example of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court applying the long-derided "scintilla rule," though the court of
course does not acknowledge this. The only evidence of any kind
indicating that the brakes may have been defective was the declaration of young Sean McPhillips that he did not feel the rear wheel
lock after he applied the brakes.i 4 Remember, however, that
Sean also had testified at another point in his deposition that the
brakes had "locked" when he applied them. 155 If the plaintiff's selfcontradictory declarations on a material point can overcome the
testimony of an eyewitness, the failure to present any evidence on
proximate cause in light of the conditions of the lawn, the common
sense observations of the trial judge regarding the stopping distance involved and the absence of probative and relevant expert
testimony, then the supreme court clearly was operating in the domain of the scintilla rule.
In another case, decided nearly a decade before McPhillips,
the supreme court went to a similar extreme in reversing a grant of
summary judgment in order to let the jury consider an issue. In
Steinberg v. State, 5 6 plaintiffs complained that the defendant law
enforcement officials had violated their civil rights because of an
inordinately long detention between the time of the plaintiffs'
arrest and their arraignment. In a motion for summary judgment,
the defendants submitted an affidavit stating that the reason for a
delay of some thirty-eight hours was that the plaintiffs furnished
them with false names and their fingerprints had to be sent to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., for identification. 15 7 The arrested individuals did not file any affidavit in opposition.' 5 8 Even so, the supreme court held, in effect, that the
affidavit filed by the defendant police officers did not show the absence of a genuine issue and that the trial judge improperly concluded that there had been no unnecessary delay in presenting the
plaintiffs for arraignment.' 5 9
or which is clearly in conflict with principles established by the laws of science, is
of no probative value and a jury is not permitted to rest its verdict thereon...
154. See supra text accompanying note 140.
155. See supra text accompanying note 139.
156. 427 A.2d 338 (RI. 1981).
157. Id. at 339.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 340.
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These two cases illustrate how the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has allowed the jury to venture into the realm of speculation
and conjecture. In McPhillips, a young boy rode his bicycle across
a snow-covered lawn bent on using it in a manner for which it was
not designed, only to decide "one and one-half to two feet" before
the retaining wall that he did not wish to make this dangerous
leap. His friend was clear in stating that the brake caused the rear
wheel to stop, as it was designed to do, and the unfortunate rider
himself was ambiguous as to the response of the brake to the pressure he applied on the pedals. This was coupled with the conclusory affidavit of the plaintiffs expert, not to mention that, as the
trial judge implied, there was a total lack of any evidence connecting the defective brake-if there indeed was one-to the injuries.
It seems, then, that the trial judge correctly opined that no one
could have used and gained the benefit of brakes upon a decision
made two feet from the edge of the wall over which one was about
to ride.
Likewise, in Steinberg, the jury-under the supreme court's
approach-was permitted to speculate as to how long a time was
reasonable for law enforcement officials, confronted with individuals who refuse to give their proper names, to ascertain identities
through fingerprints sent to Washington, D.C. It seems that here
the supreme court confused the burden of persuasion with the burden of producing evidence. Once the defendants presented evidence showing that the plaintiffs withheld their correct names and
that this had occasioned the "goose chase" to learn their identity,
the burden of producing evidence then should have shifted back to
the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the arresting officials or their
colleagues at the F.B.I. had been improperly dilatory in straighten1 60
ing out the mess.
160.

The distinction between the burden of proof (or persuasion) and the bur-

den of producing evidence is often not appreciated, though our supreme court explained the distinction precisely more than seventy years ago when it adopted the
language of an early commentary on the Rules of Evidence.
The term "burden of proof" has two distinct meanings. By the one is
meant the duty of establishing the truth of a given proposition or issue by
such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case in which the
issue arises; by the other is meant the duty of producing evidence at the
beginning or at any subsequent stage of the trial, in order to make or meet
a primafacie case. Generally speaking, the burden of proof, in the sense
of the duty of producing evidence, passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while the burden of proof, meaning the obligation to establish
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The jury, of course, is an integral part of our constitutional

democracy, and in my view, functions quite well. This is not to say,
however, that the court should give the civil jury tasks beyond the
one for which it was ordained, namely the resolution of disputes
over material facts-facts of consequence-in order to render an
ultimate determination on whether the party assigned the burdens
of proof and persuasion by the law has met this burden. In this
regard it is important to remember that the function of the civil
jury is circumscribed considerably when measured against that of
the criminal jury. Because in criminal cases society has imposed
almost the entire risk of non-persuasion on itself,' 6 ' the court may
not grant summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of law, or
any variants of these procedures, in favor of the state, nor may the
trial judge entertain a motion for a new trial brought by the state
after a not guilty verdict has been returned. This is all in contradistinction to the numerous opportunities the civil law allows for
the intervention of the judge to either terminate proceedings prior
to trial or interrupt the trial in a final fashion by way of a judgment as a matter of law prior to the jury receiving the case. 162
In discharging their important, but narrow function, jurors
may not speculate, make illogical inferential leaps or determine an
outcome because of sympathy for a party any more than they may
send messages to an audience beyond the courtroom, nullify statutes or articulate social policy. While nullification, message-sending and the like are undoubtedly rare, they can be addressed on a
the truth of the claim by a preponderance of evidence, rests throughout
upon the party asserting the afrmative of the issue, and unless he meets
this obligation upon the whole case he fails. This burden of proof never
shifts during the course of a trial, but remains with him to the end.
Giblin v. Dudley Hardware Co., 117 A. 418,419 (PlI. 1922) (quoting 10 R.C.L. Evidence § 45 (current version at LI. IL Evid. 302)).
In Steinberg, the plaintiffs could have invoked Rule 56(f) to give them an ample opportunity through discovery to determine if the defendants in fact needed
the 38 hours to get results to their identity inquiry.
161. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests ofthe defendant are of
such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional
requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to
exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In
the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.
Id.
162. MI. Super. Ct. R Civ. P. 50.
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motion for a new trial when they arise in the context of a civil case.
The problem of speculation, however, is often present, and can be
excised from the trial process as early as the Rule 56 motion. In
my view, the judge engages in a weighing methodology to do this.
I submit the judge undertakes weighing because she or he
must consider the nature of the evidence and the persuasiveness of
the inference that a party claims the evidence supports. This is
illustrated in Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp.'

63

Thomas Banks,

while under the lawful age for drinking, was served alcoholic beverages at a bar operated by the defendants. While intoxicated, he
dove off the end of a pier that formed part of defendant's outdoor
bar and broke his neck.' 6 4 At the close of the presentation of plaintiffs case, the defendant corporation and one Kilroy, its sole stockholder and principal officer, moved for a directed verdict. Kilroy
prevailed, but Bowen's Landing Corp. did not, and ultimately a
verdict was rendered against it. On appeal, the supreme court
rebuffed Bowen's contention that a directed verdict should have
been entered in its favor as well as the plaintiffs argument that its
case against Kilroy had been improperly terminated.
It is what the supreme court said about Kilroy's responsibility

165

that is of concern here. The plaintiff argued that Kilroy

should be held responsible in his individual capacity as shareholder and manager because he approved a decision to hire an
eighteen year old entertainer and this, said plaintiff Banks, "constituted evidence that [Kilroy] desired to attract underage patrons
who would then be served alcohol." 166 The supreme court rejected
this argument: "Such an inference is not based upon any appropriate primary inference but would require a speculative leap that a
jury would not be permitted to make."

67

Remaining mindful that the standard governing a directed
verdict is the same that applies to summary judgment motions, we
may fairly ask what is the trial judge-or the supreme court-considering in reaching such a result? While the conclusion of the
supreme court about the validity of the inference is hardly irrational, it is just as possible to reach a contrary conclusion. It is not
163. 652 A.2d 461 (RI. 1995).
164. Id. at 462.
165. See id. at 464-65.

166. Id. at 464.
167. Id.
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implausible that a young entertainer hired to perform in a bar is
supposed to attract a large crowd of young people who will then
spend money on what the bar offers for sale, namely alcoholic
drinks, soft drinks and food. This conclusion would not be possible
if the eighteen year old entertainer were a violin virtuoso on tour
with the Boston Symphony Orchestra and if the bar was an eleemosynary institution, but that of course was not the case in Banks.
Again, my concern is not whether the Banks court was correct, but
whether the mental process engaged in by judges to select one inference over the other is a specie of weighing.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's inordinate deference to the
jury in civil cases is not supported by its earlier jurisprudence. 168
The early court did not mince words in rejecting the notion that a
scintilla of evidence could sustain a verdict: "a mere scintilla of evidence is never sufficient to sustain a verdict, or, according to the
modern rule, even to warrant a trial court in submitting the case to
the jury."16 9 This pronouncement evolved over the course of the
next fifty years to a declaration by the supreme court that on a
motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the presentation
168. This history of the civil jury trial in Rhode Island is a lengthy topic beyond
the scope of this article, but the reader is directed to one of the most thoughtful
and scholarly opinions in the annals of Rhode Island law, Gunn v. Union R.R., 62
A. 118 (R.I. 1905), a tour de force survey of early state and federal practice regarding the judge's role in evaluating the legal and factual sufficiency of evidence to
determine if the case should be submitted to the jury. Contrary to the exaggerated
deference to the jury's role that infuses the legal ethos in this jurisdiction, an argument can be made that the early Rhode Island practice of allowing for two and
sometimes three jury trials on the same case, id. at 123-25, evinces skepticism
about, rather than a reverence for, jury verdicts. Saying that our forebears had an
unalloyed faith in juries because they allowed the same case to be retried as a
matter of course is like saying the Italians revere government because they have
had nearly fifty of them since World War I.
169. Hehir v. Rhode Island Co., 58 A. 246 (R.I. 1904). Neither Hehir nor any
other Rhode Island Supreme Court decision has specifically defined "scintilla,"
though it has been indirectly defined by way of reference to other standards. E.g.,
Caswell Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981) ("[Slubstantial
evidence as used in [zoning law] means such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means in amount
more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance."). Contextually, it appears
that the Rhode Island Supreme Court always has used this term in accordance
with the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary, 1345 (6th ed. 1991), under the entries for "Scintilla," ("A spark; a remaining participle; a trifle; the least participle."), id., and "Scintilla of Evidence Rule," ("A spark of evidence. A metaphorical
expression to describe a very insignificant or trifling item or particle of evidence.")
Id.
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of all the evidence, "it became the duty of the trial justice not
merely to determine whether a plaintiffs evidence made out a
prima facie case for the jury but whether such evidence was sufficient in law to support a verdict in plaintiffs favor and if not to
direct a verdict against them." 7 0 What are we to make of these
declarations, particularly in light of the even more recent pronouncement that "[prima facie evidence is that amount of evidence that, if unrebutted, is sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof
in a particular issue?" 17 1 In my view, the satisfaction of the burden of proof cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but must be related
specifically by the trial judge to the available facts. Thus, the question is not whether on a Rule 56 motion the party to whom the law
has assigned the burden of proof has presented some evidence on
each fact of consequence, that is, on each constituent element of
the cause of action (or affirmative defense), but whether the evidence is sufficient in "amount" and quality so that it could persuade a fact finder that the party with the burden has met it. This
is the weighing the Celotex trilogy permits, its disclaimers notwithstanding, and happily-for my thesis, at least-there are declarations in Rhode Island case law that can be used as building blocks
to this conclusion.
When I say that the Rhode Island Supreme Court should
frankly acknowledge that some weighing is occurring when the
trial judge considers a Rule 56 motion-especially if this is done
with the criteria of the Celotex trilogy-it may appear to some that
I am engaging in heresy. I do not think that is the case and, at the
very worst, it is a pseudo-heresy. A true heresy in the common law
would be a departure by a lower court judge from the clear precedent or express mandates of the court of last resort in his or her
jurisdiction, even though the heretical pronouncement be
grounded in common sense and experience. For example, Chief
Judge Jon Newman of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit labeled as heresy his recommendation that, on motion for judgments of acquittal in some criminal cases, trial judges
should consider the credibility of the state's witness when the
trustworthiness of the only witness to the crime has been signifi170. Simeone v. Prato, 111 A.2d 708 (R.I. 1955) (emphasis added).
171. Paramount Office Supply Co. v. Maclsaac, Inc., 525 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I.
1987) (emphasis added).
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cantly undermined. 7 2 On the other hand, in the Celotex trilogy,
the language of the majority opinions is replete with language suggesting that a weighing process is occurring, and the reader can
make her or his own judgment as to whether I-and Justices
White and Brennan in their Matsushita and Liberty Lobby dissents-are correct in arguing that the Court is permitting this
practice.
What is so drastic about weighing in the Celotex mode? One
distinguished scholar has suggested that the "drastic-cautious,"
pre-Celotex standard "would not permit a jury to find a traffic light
green if forty bishops testified it was not, or a debt unpaid in the
face of a signed receipt without evidence of fraud or the like."173
What I am advocating will appear as less than even pseudoheretical, if not positively mainstream, when we observe the
number of instances created by the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
both through rule and judicial fiat, allowing a trial judge to intervene in a definitive manner before a case is submitted to the jury.
Two of the most significant situations involve the pre-trial evaluation of the merits of a punitive damages claim and the trial judge's
determination of the existence of a duty in negligence cases.
172. Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979
(1993). Judge Newman acknowledged that he was "moving past the provocative to
the heretical," id. at 997, by suggesting that in some cases appellate courts should
abandon the prohibition against assessing the credibility of witnesses on motions
for judgments of acquittal, especially where the witness has been "seriously impeached" or where "a witness is indisputably shown to have lied on prior occasions,
perhaps under oath, and is currently in a position to save himself years ofjail time
by accusing the defendant." Id. at 997-98.
173. David P. Currie, Thoughts on DirectedVerdicts and Summary Judgments,
45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 72, 72-73 (1977). Professor Currie's article was one of three
important discussions that the Supreme Court relied upon in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 n.5 (1986). The other two are Martin B. Louis, supra note
8, see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 n.5, and William Schwarzer, Summary Judgment
Under the FederalRules: Defining GeneralIssues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465
(1984), see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. Professor Currie's principal contribution is
found in the concluding sentences of his seven page article:
The purpose of rule 56 requires that summary judgment be granted if and
only if the evidence before the court would justify a directed verdict if
presented at trial. Consequently, the rule should be amended to make
clear that a motion for summary judgment, without more, puts an opposing party with the burden of proof to the task of producing evidence sufflicient to sustain a favorable verdict.
Currie, supra, at 79 (footnote omitted).
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V. A HOPEFUL DEVIATION
Three years ago, in Palmisanov. Toth, 174 without either precedent or any expression in the rules to guide it, but mindful of "[its]
plenary revisory powers," 17 5 the Rhode Island Supreme Court ordained that an evidentiary hearing must be conducted by a judge
designated by the presiding judge of the superior court when a defendant moves to strike a punitive judgment count on the grounds
that the evidence available to the plaintiff cannot sustain it.176 After conducting a hearing that would allow for the cross-examination of witnesses, the presentation of contradictory witnesses and
apparently the weighing of evidence and the assessment of witness
credibility, the trial judge must make a determination "whether
the evidence presented as a matter of law and fact warrants submission to a trier of fact (either judge or jury) of the punitive-damage issue." 17 7 Whether one agrees with the supreme court's policy
determination that a defendant facing a count for punitive damages is "to be protected from undue harassment, embarrassment,
and oppression," 78 or the means it adopted to shield the defendant, there can be no doubt that the supreme court intruded into an
area previously occupied by the jury. After all, prior to Palmisano,
174. 624 A.2d 314 (R.I. 1993).
175. Id. at 320.
176. The supreme court was creative and acknowledged its departure from the
rules, if not from precedent:
If a defendant believes that a punitive-damage claim cannot be supported
factually and legally, the defendant may move to strike the claim for punitive damages. This motion will not be in strict accord with Rule 12(f) of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, but instead it will have the
appropriate expanded function to test by an evidentiary hearing the propriety of a claim for punitive damages .... The motion may be referred to
a justice of the Superior Court on whatever calendar the presiding justice
of that court determines appropriate. The plaintiff may present evidence
in opposition to the motion sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing
of his or her eligibility for punitive damages, which would be determined
in accordance with our standards that the defendant acted so willfully,
maliciously, or recklessly as to amount to conduct bordering on
criminality.
Id. Prior to this decision, such an attack on a punitive damages claim would have
been proper under Rule 56, but no evidentiary hearing with the attendant assessing of credibility would have been permitted. We can conclude then, that when it
sees fit, our supreme court is prepared to relax-if not abandon-its prohibitions
regarding weighing the evidence, and even assessing credibility prior to a case going to the jury.
177. Id. at 320-21 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 320.
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had not the only consideration for the trial justice been whether
there was any evidence on the record that could allow a reasonable
inference of recklessness or willfulness "as amounted to
crimlinality?"' 7 9
Similarly, a trial judge is necessarily involved in the "heretical" weighing of evidence and credibility determinations when considering the competency of a witness to testify, 8 0o the helpfulness
of expert testimony to the jury' 8 ' and its reliability and soundness
as well,' 8 2 and a host of issues subsumed under the rubric of "preliminary questions."183 With respect to the judge's role in examining evidence to determine if a lawful duty exists, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished the standard to be employed from the one used when a motion for directed verdict is
under consideration: "We wish to note that it is often necessary for
the trial justice to find preliminary facts in deciding questions of
law. When finding such preliminary facts, the trial justice exer179. Sherman v. McDermott, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (R.I. 1974).
180. MI. R. Evid. 601; see also ILI. R. Evid. 601 advisory committee's note, at
1104 (providing, inter alia, "the competency of infants and mentally handicapped
persons are matters to be determined by the trial justice").
181. MI. R. Evid. 701.
182. In the oft cited and much discussed case of Daubert v. Dow Pharmaceuticals, Ina, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the United States Supreme Court elaborated upon
the "gatekeeping role" for the trial judge regarding expert testimony. Id. at 597.
While acknowledging that it "[did] not presume to set out a definitive checklist or
test," id. at 593, the Supreme Court did delineate some criteria to be followed by
federal trial judges in order for them to ensure that "scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 589. In State v. Morel, 676
A.2d 1347, 1355 n.2 (R.I. 1996), our supreme court said that it found "the reasoning and guidelines [of Daubert to be] helpful and illuminating." Id. In State v.
Quattrocchi,682 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996), our supreme court found Daubertto be generally persuasive, but said that it would "leave to a later day the emphasis to be
placed on general acceptance," which is one of the criteria that Daubert declares
should be considered by a judge considering the admissibility of scientific testimony based on a new or novel theory. Id. at 884 n.2. For our purposes, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court said that in both criminal and civil cases, a trial judge
"must exercise this gatekeeping function and... conduct a preliminary examination prior to allowing scientific evidence," id. at 884, and that this evidentiary
hearing should be conducted before the judge allows the evidence to be placed
before the jury. "In a civil case, the challenge to expert testimony or scientific evidence should be made sufficiently in advance in order to alert the trial justice to
the need for holding a preliminary evidentiary hearing either prior to empaneling
a jury or outside the presence of the jury." Id. at 884 n.3.
183. RI. R. Evid. 104. On the matter of preliminary questions, see RI. R. Evid
104 advisory committee's note, at 1052 (T]o the extent that these inquiries are
factual, the judge acts as trier of fact.").
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cises his or her independent judgment and does not apply the directed-verdict standard."'1 4
With the exception of the role assigned to the trial judge by the
supreme court regarding a punitive damages hearing, these examples may not be perfect analogues to the judge's function on a Rule
56 motion, but they do demonstrate that the weighing of evidence
and assessment of credibility are not exclusively the province of
the jury. In fact, the trial judge regularly engages in this activity
prior to submitting the case to the jury, and often with the consequence that she or he decides that the case-or a portion of it-is
not in a posture to go to the jury.
Perhaps a more important-and certainly a more direct-signal of the supreme court's willingness to assign a more active role
to the trial judge on a Rule 56 motion is an opinion offered by Justice Murray, without dissent, in the same year she wrote Palmisano. In Regnier v. Cahill,8 5 after the ritual incantation that "It]he
trial justice must bear in mind that a summary-judgment [sic] motion is a drastic and dispositive remedy and, therefore, should be
granted with caution," Justice Murray used words that, at the very
least, suggest that a trial judge reviewing a motion for summary
judgment may permissibly conduct an evidentiary hearing not un86
like that permitted by Palmisano.1
"An evidentiary hearing on
the merits of the defendant's counterclaims and defenses may or
may not reveal the existence of genuine issues of material fact,
particularly whether there is a surplus or a deficiency of monies
owed to the plaintiff." 18 7 To any suggestion that Justice Murray's
reference to "an evidentiary hearing" meant a trial, I would reply
that Rule 56 contemplates the determination of the "existence of
genuine issues of material fact" well in advance of the trial and
that, in any event, this eminent and precise jurist would have used
the word "trial" if she meant trial. Moreover, Justice Murray was
describing a hearing that has as its objective identifying the genuine issues, not resolving them.
More troublesome than any quibble with Justice Murray's
choice of words is the declaration by the supreme court three years
later that a trial judge considering a Rule 56 motion may speculate
184.
185.
186.
187.

Rodriques v. Miriam Hospital, 623 A.2d 456, 461 (R.I. 1993).
618 A.2d 1266 (LI. 1993).
Id. at 1267.
Id.
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as to what the non-moving party may be able to show at trial. In
Boland v. Town of Tiverton,'8 8 the supreme court, not surprisingly,
began its discussion of summary judgment with the "drastic-cautious" mantra before it observed that "'t]hiscourt notes that the
record before us contains sufficient facts that, if more fully developed at trial,... could probably support a finding [in favor of the
non-moving party]." 1s 9 Where, it may be fairly asked, does Rule 56
permit the trial judge to speculate as to what may be "more fully
developed at trial?" 9 0° Rule 56, after all, is a pre-trial procedure
designed to determine if a party has presented sufficient evidence
for the claim or defense to go to trial and be placed before a jury.
While the trial judge must look toward the trial conceptually in
order to make a determination as to where the burdens of persuasion are assigned by the substantive law, the judge should not confuse this role with making a determination as to what a reasonable
jury might do if certain facts were to be developed later at trial.
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that Rule 56(e) affords the
party opposing the motion an ample opportunity to gather and submit to the court evidence in support of its contention if it is unavailable when the motion is first brought. The dichotomous views
of Regnier v. Cahill and Boland v. Town of Tiverton should be harmonized during any undertaking by the supreme court to refine
and clarify summary judgment practice.
CONCLUSION

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court handed down the
Celotex trilogy, which provided federal trial judges with specific
and workable principles for the consideration of Rule 56 motions.
While these decisions have no binding effect on the states, a
number of courts and scholarly commentators have noted the helpful and salutary effect of the principles set forth in the trilogy.
Apart from one passing reference to Matsushita, the Rhode Island
188. 670 A.2d 1245 (R.I. 1996).
189. Id. at 1248-49 (emphasis added).
190. The Celotex construct clearly does not permit deference to potential developments at trial. "[D]istrict courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power
to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice
that she had to come forward with all of her evidence." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (second emphasis added).
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Supreme Court, without stating any reasons for doing so, has ignored these decisions.
As to why Rhode Island follows this course, we can only
surmise. Clearly, to this point in time, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court is comfortable with its principal teaching that summary
judgment is a drastic remedy to be applied only with great caution.
Additionally, the supreme court has in my view an unduly solicitous and historically unjustifiable deference to the role of the jury
in civil cases.
The Celotex trilogy moved federal summary judgment considerations beyond the realm of the clich6 into that of a principled and
workable analytical framework that affords guidance to the trial
bench and bar. The central principles to be gleaned from the trilogy are: (1) Rule 56 is an integral part of the pretrial regime of
procedure and should be used wherever required; (2) the moving
party need only point to deficiencies in the non-moving party's
case, whereupon the non-moving party must produce a sufficient
amount of evidence to forestall the granting of a motion; (3) it is
crucial that the trial judge look at the burdens of the contending
parties, not only in terms of who is pressing the motion or crossmotion for summary judgment, but to determine who has the burden of proof at trial as mandated by the controlling substantive
law; (4) the standard to be employed in considering motions for
summary judgment is virtually identical to that used in determining which party should prevail on a motion for a judgment as a
matter of law; (5) the scintilla rule has no place in summary judgment considerations; and (6) the central question to be resolved by
the trial judge considering a motion for summary judgment is
whether the quantum and quality of the evidence is sufficient to
permit a rational trier of fact to return a verdict in favor of the
party to whom the substantive law has assigned the burden of
proof.
In my view, these principles mean that, among other things,
the trial judge becomes involved in weighing the evidence (as distinguished from assessing the credibility of witnesses, which in
any event, would be an impossibility), just as Justices Brennan
and White suggested in their Liberty Lobby and Matsushita
dissents.
All is not bleak in Rhode Island for one to advocate, as I do, the
wholesale adoption of the principles of the Celotex trilogy. Rhode
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Island's legal history is replete with examples showing the
supreme court's rejection of the scintilla standard. In addition,
many court-fashioned procedures give trial judges considerable
leeway in the area of weighing evidence-and sometimes assessing
credibility of witnesses-at points prior to submission of the case
to the jury. Within the last several years the supreme court has
created, through the use of its plenary powers, a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to be employed when a defendant contends that there
is no basis to support a cause of action for punitive damages; and
the court has adverted to the possibility of an evidentiary hearing
being conducted in conjunction with the pressing of a motion for
summary judgment.
Whatever the historical developments in Rhode Island have
been relative to summary judgment and the role of the civil jury,
the trial bench and bar are in need of workable and principled criteria for the evaluation of Rule 56 motions. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court is in a position to meet this need by adopting the
criteria of the Celotex trilogy, which should be read in conjunction
with the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements in Greenwich Collieries regarding burdens and the fact finder's intensity of
belief, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court's similar declarations
in Parkerv. Parker.'9 ' Clearly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
may do this in the exercise of its plenary power.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, like any common law court
of last resort, is no stranger to reversing or modifying its course.
Whether the court will follow the path of Celotex principles remains to be seen; but whatever it ultimately does, we know that it
192
will be final and infallible.

191.
192.

238 A.2d 57, 60-61 (LI. 1968).
See supra note 34.

